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Abstract  
The article offers an easy-to-use indicator for scholars and practitioners to measure 
whether NGOs, international organizations, and government policies and projects 
meet the criteria for design and implementation of “capacity building” projects that 
have been established by various international organizations and that are 
recognized by experts in the field. The indicator can be used directly to address 
failures that are routinely reported in this key and growing development 
intervention. Use of this indicator on more than a dozen standard interventions 
funded today by international development banks, UN organizations, country 
donors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) reveals that while many 
smaller organizations are working to change institutions and society in ways that 
effectively build long-term capacity, most of the major actors in the field of 
development have failed to follow their own guidelines. Many appear to be using 
“capacity building” as a cover for lobbying foreign governments to promote 
international agendas (“purchasing foreign officials”) and/or to increase the power 
of particular officials at the expense of democracy, with the public lacking simple 
accountability tools. The indicator points to specific areas for holding development 
actors accountable in order to promote development goals of sustainability and 
good governance. The breadth of the field of “capacity building” also allows this 
indicator to be used, with some modifications, for a large variety of development 
interventions.  This article also offers several examples of where current capacity 
building projects fail, along with a sample test of the indicator using UNCDF as a 
case study. 
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1. Introduction  
“Capacity building” has become the tool of choice for several major international 
“development” organizations in recent years, including the United Nations system, 
the World Bank and other development banks, major international government bi-
lateral donors as well as non-governmental organizations. As of 2009, some $20 
billion per year of international development intervention funding went for capacity 
development; roughly 20 percent of total funding in this category (Otoo, Agapitova 
and Behrens, 2009). The World Bank itself commits more than $1 billion per year 
to this service in loans or grants (more than 10 percent of its portfolio of nearly $10 
billion) (World Bank, 2005) and identifies it in all of its formulaic country studies as 
a ‘core objective,’ while the U.N. system practically defines itself by capacity 
development as the “how” for ‘“how” UNDP works’ to fulfill its mission32. Between 
1995 and 2004, the World Bank committed $9 billion in loans and $900 million in 
grants to capacity building; roughly $1 Billion per year. In 2007, the total bank 
lending was $9.1 billion (World Bank, 2005:9). According to recent statistics from 
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, 12 percent of the 
$15 billion that went to 38 ‘fragile states’ in 2007, of a total official development 
assistance of $101.3 billion, went for ‘governance and civil society,’ the key area of 
‘capacity building.’ (OECD, 2008:12). Using the OECD figure of $101.3 billion, the 
$20 billion reported by Otoo et al (2009) would amount to 20 percent.) According to 
the UNDP’s current promotional campaign, ‘capacity is development’ and ‘the 
urgency of “how”’ (whatever that means) (UNDP Global Capacity Development 
Facility, 2014)33. 
Despite the enormous reliance on this tool to implement missions of (sustainable) 
‘human development’ or the rather different goals of ‘poverty reduction; economic 
growth; improved services’ (World Bank, 2005) or ‘poverty eradication’ (UNDP, 
2002), the very organizations that are most committed to this tool are also the first 
to admit that they do not follow their own guidelines (if any) and that results are 
often the opposite of what they claim they are trying to achieve. 
A World Bank review noted that ‘examples abound’ in which these initiatives 
‘severely undermine public management in recipient countries and unwittingly 
block rather than promote progress in public sector reform and institution-building’ 
(World Bank, 2000). Despite such harsh criticisms dating back almost two 
decades, little has changed since a 2005 study that showed that the World Bank 
had almost no interest in applying the lessons and clear standards that already 
existed in the Bank for running such projects; knowingly creating a double standard 
for its capacity building of foreign governments. ‘The Bank does not apply the 
same rigorous business practices to its capacity building work that it applies in 
other areas. Its tools—notably technical assistance and training—are not 
effectively used... Moreover, most activities lack standard quality assurance 
processes at the design stage, and they are not routinely tracked, monitored, and 
evaluated’ (World Bank, 2005). 
A UNDP study of its capacity building projects in 2002 reported almost exactly the 
same phenomenon and the UNDP has also done little or nothing to correct this 
problem since. Among the implementing practitioners, ‘There were no generally 
agreed standards as to what should be expected of newly created or strengthened 
                                                                                                         
32UNDP Website (2014) URL (consulted 17 June 2015): http://www.undp.org/capacity/. 
33 UNDP (2014) Going for Scale, Going for Sustainability, Going for Quality. URL (consulted 17 June 
2015): http://www.undp.org/capacity 
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national capacity or of institution or organisation building (UNDP, 200234).’ Despite 
the fact that the U.N. system and other reports describe exactly how results based 
measurements could be done in this field (UNDP 199835, 200436, 200637), with 
guidelines easily accessible on the Internet, U.N. officials continue to offer the 
excuse that results ‘cannot be easily measured’ to justify why they do not follow 
measurement procedures and apply a double standard. As a practitioner in the 
field for more than 30 years, it is this author’s view that the situation has actually 
gotten worse rather than better. While others may disagree, there is little that they 
can point to in terms of oversight or measurements that create accountability in this 
field. The failures may be by design. 
According to one early observer looking at the state of the field, ‘capacity building’ 
is simply being used as a ‘buzz word’ by international agencies for whatever they 
wish to do, with or without any accountability or logic (Enemark, 2003). The current 
state of the field among the major donors is such that it appears to have already 
reached a theatre of the absurd. Projects (some described below) may be the 
equivalent of seeking to turn current government clerks into brain surgeons (or the 
equivalent of teaching elephants to fly rather than buying birds) in a purported 
attempt to meet the need for specialized professionals without having to add or fire 
staff or to establish performance standards. Other projects take the approach of 
seeking to convince wolves to turn vegetarian through “consciousness-raising” in 
“rights” or in “learning” how not to be corrupt, rather than facing the real underlying 
cause of the problem, such as the needs to build walls around the henhouse or find 
ways to put more power on the side of the hens. Many projects have no measures 
of intended results and lack fit with a development strategy or logic. 
Educators and consultants who work in the field and are paid handsomely to “build 
capacity” also have little incentive to hold themselves to systematic standards 
since it might make their contributions obsolete. By definition, the more services 
they are hired to provide, the more “capacity” they build and the more they profit, 
whether or not their contribution is really the most efficient, effective or sustainable, 
or addresses the institutional root causes of the lack of capacity in the first place. 
Generally, these projects are evaluated with ‘smile sheets’, asking beneficiaries if 
they are ‘happy’ or ‘better off’ and measuring things like ‘raised awareness’, 
‘enhanced skills’, and ‘improved teamwork’ that are ‘locally driven’, rather than on 
whether the underlying problems are solved, and refraining from asking whether 
there may be hidden agendas to buy influence, subsidize elites, and continue 
dependency (Otoo et al, 2009). 
The major donors, themselves, admit that they have little incentive to end the 
double standard and achieve consistency in this area, despite the fact that they 
have long ago elaborated clear and basic frameworks and standards for how to 
appropriately measure key components of capacity building (including strategic 
planning for efficiency, service delivery, or application of skills). The World Bank’s 
2005 evaluation noted that practitioners shaped and reshaped definitions and 
                                                                                                         
34 UNDP (2002) Capacity Building for Poverty Eradication: Analysis of and Lessons From Evaluations of 
UN System Support to Countries’ Efforts. URL (consulted 17 June 2015): 
http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/Capacity_Building_for_Poverty_Eradication.pdf. 
35 UNDP (1998) Capacity Assessment and Development. In a Systems and Strategic Management 
Context. Technical Advisory Paper No.3, Bureau for Development Policy (Bahman Kia and Richard 
Flaman). URL (consulted 17 June 2015): http://portals.wi.wur.nl/files/docs/ppme/capsystech3-98e.pdf 
36 UNDP (2004) National Human Development Reports (NHDR) and the Use of Governance Indicators. 
URL (consulted 17 June 2015): http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs06/NHDR.pdf. 
37 UNDP (2006) A Review of Selected Capacity Development Methodologies, Bureau of Development 
Policy. URL (consulted 17 June 2015): http://74.125.153.132/search?q=cache:lL3zLvOiv0gJ:www.lac-
workspace.undp.org.co/fileadmin/desarrollo_capacidades/Documentos/Resource_Catalogue-
Review_of_Selected_Capacity_Assessment_Methodologies.doc+UNDP+(1998):+Capacity+Assessmen
t+and+Development.+Technical+Advisory+Paper+No.3&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk. 
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standards to suit themselves with some development agencies using ‘a narrow 
definition focused on strengthening organizations and skills’, with the World Bank, 
itself offering ‘no operational policy to guide its capacity building works’ (World 
Bank, 2005). A UNDP study in 2002 similarly reported that there was ‘no system-
wide framework’ and that participants’ use of the terms ‘capacity,’ ‘capacity 
building’ and ‘performance’ showed ‘wide disparities’ (UNDP, 2002). Moreover, 
almost none of the units within UNDP sought to collect any baseline data and their 
documents from the two previous decades where such data might exist, routinely 
“disappeared” into “storage.” 
The abuse of the “tool” of “capacity building” or the substitution of this tool and its 
inputs for any measurable development outputs is not unique to this international 
development intervention (Schachter, 2000). In the absence of clear public 
pressures and accountability measures, many development actors of good or 
dubious intent justify interventions on the basis of the importance of the symptoms 
they are treating rather than on actual measurable impact that they say is too 
difficult or costly to determine; throwing money to build capacity and “strengthen” 
whomever receives it, rather than addressing problem causes. They often use their 
location overseas and their direct relations with foreign officials as ways to further 
hide their activities from public scrutiny in either the donor or recipient countries. In 
the area of “capacity building,” where the “poor” and members of the “public” are 
easy to exclude, the transfers of money and resources are often directly from 
government officials in one (powerful) country to those in another (weaker) country 
in what can be labelled building the “capacity” of the weaker bureaucrats through a 
legitimized form of corruption and abuse that circumvents international law. The 
(perhaps intended) result is that development projects often serve the interests of 
those government bureaucrats channelling the funds and those who receive them 
rather than the public that is supposed to benefit from measurable results 
(Lempert, 2008).  
Although some may view statements like this as rather bold, officials in developed 
countries are often the first to admit that they use ‘aid’ as a form of ‘soft power’ (as 
opposed to military power and economic pressure) in order to manipulate the 
political systems of weaker countries (Nye, 2004). Moreover, this attempt to 
influence decisions by government officials in weaker countries through use of 
financial benefits directed to those officials, in ways that favour the interests of the 
businesses and peoples of the donor country over other countries and/or over the 
peoples of the recipient countries, easily meets the definitions of corruption that are 
recognized under international law and that are the very practices that 
governments all claim they are trying to eliminate. It would be relatively easy for 
lawyers to find government officials in both the donor and recipient countries in 
violation of various provisions of the United Nations Declaration Against 
Corruption38 under Articles 15 and 16 (bribery), 18 (trading influence), and 19 
(abuse of functions). Transparency International, the international NGO that is the 
recognized expert on corruption and that is largely funded by major donor 
countries, would also classify these behaviours as corruption under their definition 
of ‘political corruption’ in which funds are used to influence politicians to ‘steer 
away from good government’ and to make decisions on the basis of factors other 
than the ‘public interest’ in ways that ‘divert resources’.39  
In answer to these challenges in the development field, recent articles by this 
author have chosen not merely to expose the problems and call for “change” but 
                                                                                                         
38 U.N. Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions (1996): 
A/RES/51/191. URL (consulted 17 June 2015): http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r191.htm. 
39Transparency International (2015). URL (consulted 17 June 2015): 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo. 
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have taken some of the initial steps to establish indicators and benchmarks 
through which the public and organizations can easily arm themselves to hold 
international development actors accountable to international law, to their mission 
statements for their interventions and to professional standards. These indicators 
are offered as easy-to-use tools (essentially, new public “weapons”) to create 
accountability and transparency in the use of public funds in development 
interventions; directly exposing abuses and offering specific directives for 
improvements. Previous indicators began with tests of whether development 
projects met international treaty standards for promoting the agreed development 
objectives of ‘sustainable development’ (Lempert and Nguyen, 2008) as well as 
other basic governance objectives to promote self reliance and end colonial 
‘dependency’ (Lempert, 2009), to build “democracy” and protect rights as key 
international legal goals of good governance (Lempert, 2010a; 2011) and to hold 
development professionals to ethics standards in order to eliminate conflicts of 
interest (Lempert, 1997). This is also part of a larger initiative to build organizations 
that will monitor and challenge donors (Lempert, 2008). 
The article offers an easy-to-use indicator for scholars and practitioners to measure 
whether NGOs, international organizations, and government policies and projects 
meet the criteria for design and implementation of “capacity building” in ways that 
have been established by various international organizations, themselves, and that 
are recognized by experts in the field. This article also serves as a model for 
accountability in the use of other developments inputs by offering an approach can 
be adapted to specific interventions. Indeed, “capacity building” itself is an umbrella 
for many specific tools – education, awareness, providing equipment, strategic 
planning, consulting advice, etc. – that can be measured using similar approaches. 
The article begins by defining “capacity building” according to basic internationally 
agreed principles that can be placed into an indicator, then surveys existing 
indicators, explains why several international “capacity building” projects now fail in 
the absence of an indicator or standard to hold them accountable to minimal levels 
of competence, then offers a new indicator and tests it on several categories of 
projects, including a detailed examination of how to use the indicator on an 
organization like the United Nations Capital Development Fund40 that claims to be 
doing capacity building as it central tool. 
2. Principles of “capacity building” 
The principles of “capacity building” as a standard development intervention are 
generally agreed upon not only by major donors but also by the community of non-
governmental organizations and by business consulting firms that do capacity 
building in the government, private business, and NGO sectors (UNDP, 199141; 
1998; World Bank, 2002; 2004; 2005). This makes it relatively simple to test 
whether organizations are actually doing what they say they have committed to do.  
Though organizations use different wording and order, and much of the wording is 
confusing given jargon in the field, there are really five key concepts that are the 
essential basis of capacity building: three of them relating to the ability of a system 
to operate and perform a public function at three different levels (its legal and 
political authority or “enabling environment” within a larger social and political 
context; its managerial ability internally to perform effectively and efficiently that is 
often referred to as its “institutional development”; and the skills of its staff – its 
                                                                                                         
40 United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) (2009) Website “About UNCDF”. URL (consulted 
17 June 2015): http://www.uncdf.org/english/about_uncdf/index.php. 
41 UNDP (1991) A Strategy for Water Sector Capacity Building' in Delft, The Netherlands. URL 
(consulted 17 June 2015): http://www.gdrc.org/uem/capacity-define.html 
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“human resources”), one relating to good governance (its public accountability), 
and one relating to the long term sustainability of the function. 
Given that these are generally recognized, they do not need to be detailed here in 
full, but it is easy to understand the logic of the five elements. To be effective, an 
organization must have sufficient freedom from constraints to conduct its activities 
and must be able to use the resources that it has. It also must have people who 
are skilled, properly selected, compensated and tasked. For public organizations, 
there must be public oversight of the legal framework, of the organization itself, and 
of the skills areas (professional and technical fields and the training) and workers 
applying them to assure they are in line with public needs. This whole system must 
be sustainable and integrated, not simply driven by donors deciding to toss in 
resources or training to a specific institution, but working effectively over the long-
term with people seeking training according to public needs, being appropriately 
selected and trained, then selected on merit systems, appropriately compensated 
and tasked.  
Assuming a quick fix of channelling funds or training courses to workers in an 
institution who may be the wrong people being wrongly tasked or overseen in 
ineffective organizations, or to educational institutions that may be training people 
who will never be hired or that lack the capacity and management for appropriate 
training may be irrelevant. The cause of failure may be at any one of these levels 
or several and that is why any solutions must address the whole system.  
More detail for readers new to this subfield is presented in the Appendix to this 
article (Section I). 
2.1. Indicators in the field and the lack of an indicator for 
“capacity development” interventions 
Though there have been attempts to develop governance indicators for 
governance projects and diagnostics to use in planning capacity development 
interventions in different kinds of organizations, there are no existing indicators to 
score “capacity building” interventions on whether or not they are meeting the basic 
professional requirements of capacity building. Nor is there any licensing or 
grading system to measure basic competence or to establish other competence 
levels for practitioners who do “capacity building” and who claim to be “capacity 
building experts.” 
Among the most recent attempts, for example, the World Bank Institute has 
developed a manual but it is filled with dozens of questions to use and impossible 
to apply as a quick diagnostic (Otoo et al, 2009). Nothing else exists in the field. 
Though there are several international measures of “good governance” and 
“democracy” these do not cover the area of capacity building. Other measures, 
with community based organizations are closer to strategic management tools than 
capacity building measures (MicKinsey, 2001; Christensen et al., 2006; Gubbels 
and Koss, 2000; Lusthaus et al, 2002). 
A review of these and others is presented briefly in the Appendix in Section II. 
2.2. The problem with many “capacity building” projects and the 
real value of an indicator  
In the absence of any professional standardization for use of the tool of capacity 
building or any accountability indicator for this approach, there is, in effect, no 
public review of the billions of dollars of public funds that are being transferred from 
developed countries to the governments and non-governmental institutions of the 
rest of the world in the guise of “capacity building.” Abuses in this area are in fact 
running rampant. At best, “capacity development” projects are just throwing money 
at symptoms with no logic or analysis. At worst they are disguised bribes to 
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government officials and attempts to undermine entire government structures by 
setting up foreign run Ministries and foreign influenced political parties or civil 
society to lobby for foreign interests.  
These problems should be familiar to everyone in the field. In the Appendix, in 
Section III, some of the abuses are presented directly for readers, in stark terms. 
Although many of the descriptions are frank and direct, coming out of professional 
observations by the author in some 30 years in this field, the donors themselves 
admit the problems as well as the underlying goals of promoting their national self 
interest through aid as “soft power”. They simply use more euphemistic language 
to soften the implications and potential exposure (Nye, 2004; Raffer and Singer, 
1996; Mayo, 2009). The author has detailed some of these cases in greater detail 
in other works as well, including those referenced here. 
Whatever the reasons for the failures, it is possible to use a simple tool to measure 
and expose the failures. 
2.3. The indicator of “capacity building” that can measure 
adherence to recognized professional standards of the field 
As a first step towards the licensing of practitioners who claim expertise in 
“capacity building” and as a way for citizens to hold donors accountable in the 
spending of their funds or in the acceptance of funds for “capacity building” while 
exposing approaches with hidden agendas, the indicator below is presented with 
20 simple questions as a litmus test of basic competence in the field. By asking 
these 20 easy “Yes or No” questions and then counting up the results (possible 11 
points), one can determine the relative competence and integrity of a “capacity 
building” project or intervention on the following scale: 
Scale: 
8 - 11 points  Comprehensive approach to “capacity building” in ways that also 
appear to be promoting sustainable development, self reliance, and 
democracy in line with the Rio Declaration and International 
Conventions 
4 - 7 points  Minimally competent approach to “capacity building” with several 
failures in procedure or safeguards 
0 – 3 points  Narrow or weak intervention 
< 0  Incompetent project with hidden agenda that has been corrupted 
either by the donor agency, stakeholders in a developing country 
bureaucracy, or both, in a possible attempt to purchase or 
influence foreign policies or to collude to misuse funds 
Note that the indicator is not an absolute scale since it is not offered as a social 
science research tool (though it can be used as such) but as a project evaluation 
and selection tool. It is best used to show the relative value of different projects. 
The indicator does not measure the quality of specific capacity building, since that 
depends on many factors and comparisons, with benchmarks and cost-benefit 
analysis. It also does not measure how effectively a capacity building intervention 
is at promoting sustainable development, self-reliance, or democracy, since these 
are covered by other indicators, though a project that gets the highest score must 
at least be paying attention to these issues. The purpose of the indicator is not to 
measure “gross benefit” or “cost benefit.” It is simply to measure compliance with 
professional standards for this type of intervention. Indeed, a capacity building 
initiative may be technically competent at building long term capacity but could still 
send a country down the wrong development path. That is why it is important to 
use this indicator in combination with others and why this indicator qualifies only as 
a litmus test for basic competence in use of this tool. (What the indicator does is 
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determine whether the project is actually doing capacity building according to the 
technical standards of the tool or is hiding another objective. It also determines 
whether other agendas and ideologies have taken control of the funds and whether 
the overall goal is really to promote development and public control or not. It is 
essentially a litmus test of basic competence in the field and application of 
appropriate safeguards to protect professionalism and the public interest.) 
Like most indicators, answers to each question would need to be “calibrated” to 
assure that different observers make the exact same determinations. To do so 
would require a longer manual for standardized, precise answers across 
observers.  
2.4. Measures/sub-factors 
Below, is an explanation of how anyone can apply the test to any project by asking 
the 20 questions and recording the scores. Most of the questions are clear cut 
“Yes” (1 point for applying a standard procedure, 0 loss of points for protecting 
against conflicts of interest or other corruption of standards) or “No” (0 points for 
failing to apply a standard procedure, -1 indicating a loss of points for facilitating 
conflicts of interest and corruption of standards), but in cases where there is a 
judgment call, you can opt for a “Debatable” (0.5 points for benefits and – 0.5 
points for harm). 
The measures of performance can be placed into two categories that look at 
application of basic professional requirements for project design (positive scoring) 
and protection of the project in implementation from conflicts of interest or negative 
development impacts (negative scoring):  
1) Proper Application of the Basic Principles and Standards of Capacity Building 
(5 of the 5 recognized principles of capacity building, including diagnostic of the 
three levels of analysis for capacity) and of Development Interventions, with 
the donor organization also serving as a model of accountability with a total of 
11 questions broken into three sub-categories.  
 The first sub-category (4 of the 5 recognized capacity building principles) looks 
at basic professionalism in diagnostic and design (7 questions for a possible 7 
points).  
 The second sub-category (the fifth of 5 capacity building principles), contingent 
on meeting the standards of the first category, addresses sustainability (2 
questions for two possible points). 
 The third sub-category addresses whether the donor or project implementing 
organization itself reflects and models the standards of good governance (2 
questions for a possible 2 points or loss of 2 points).  
(The overall potential scores for this section of 11 questions is 11 points.); 
2) Professional Safeguards are in Place Against Conflicts of Interest and Against 
Unintended Consequences that could Distort other Public or Private Systems: 
with a total of 9 questions broken into two sub-categories. 
 The first sub-category seeks to protect against conflicts of interest and against 
organizations searching for problems to fit the tool of “capacity building” or 
stakeholders to agree to projects (4 questions and a total loss of 4 points). 
 The second sub-category seeks to protect against negative or adverse impacts 
on the overall political/government system and on related business and civil 
society systems (5 questions and a potential loss of 9 points). 
(The overall potential score for this section of 9 questions is to maintain the points 
awarded in the first section.) 
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The first category (and particularly the first sub-category of 7 questions) is itself a 
screening to test whether a project actually achieves anything in the area of 
capacity building at all, and whether it meets minimal basic competence in the field. 
Questions marked with an asterisk (*) are those that apply to any development 
intervention. They represent the basic steps of project design (root cause analysis; 
benchmarks and cost benefit of interventions that are tied to specific measurable 
results and indicators; sustainability of the input), of screening to assure 
appropriate development impact, and tests of the donor organization to assure best 
practices are followed. 
Note that some of the questions below may seem lengthy, and this “simple” list 
may not look that easy to use on first glance. The questions are lengthy so that the 
goal of each question is clear and readers can train themselves to effectively score 
the question. With some short practice (working through the example in the 
Appendix, in Section V, and also considering the scoring for several projects, 
presented in the Appendix, in Section IV), readers will be able to see how the 
indicator works to distinguish interventions and to offer a valid way to score and 
improve them. 
1. Proper Application of the Basic Principles and Standards of Capacity Building (5 
of the 5 recognized principles of capacity building, including diagnostic of the three 
levels of analysis of capacity) and of Development Interventions with the donor 
organization also serving as a model of accountability: This is the category that can 
be used for screening whether the project and spending really have any substance 
and fit the basic professional competence of capacity building and of development 
interventions. (11 questions and a potential score of 11 points) A project that does 
not score more than 4 points in this category is already partly suspect as being 
driven by an outside agenda to favour a specific group rather than to promote real 
democratization and good governance. At least 5 of these questions (marked with 
an asterisk) are directly applicable to any development intervention. The other 6 
are specifically applicable to “capacity building” though they could also be 
applicable to other development interventions with slight modification. 
1.a) Project Meets 4 of 5 of the Recognized Principles of Capacity Building, 
including diagnostic of the three levels of analysis of capacity, and Principles of 
Professionalism for Development Interventions: This is the heart of the indicator. A 
project that does not score at least 4 points here is probably not competent in the 
field. (7 questions and a potential score of 7 points) 
Question 1*: 
Country and Cultural Fit of the Development Intervention for Sustainable 
Development: Fixing what is Broken. The project is not formulaic or sector specific 
(“to train judges”; “to build a modern X system”) but is fit specifically into the local 
cultures and their needs for maintaining or returning to sustainability and fixing a 
system that has broken, with the analysis beginning with an assessment of local 
needs. The question is whether the capacity building is relevant to restore the 
sustainability of the local culture(s) and repairs an existing and identifiable 
underlying problem that has moved the culture away from sustainability and needs 
to be “fixed” in line with international principles of cultural survival and sustainable 
development. The overall approach carefully incorporates the requirements of 
sustainable development established by the Rio Declaration (balance of population 
and consumption with productivity and resources) in its approach to governance as 
the basic principle of the role of governance in sustainable development (United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development42; United Nations 
                                                                                                         
42 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2008) URL (consulted 17 June 2015): 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/512/07/PDF/N0651207.pdf?OpenElement. 
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Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples43). If the approach is one that 
simply targets a “sector” in a “sector wide approach,” and/or that is an outside 
determination based on a formula or a comparison with what “developed” countries 
or cultures have, then the score here is zero because it has not started with the 
cultural fit as a whole and may simply be developing one system to the detriment of 
the overall balance for sustainability and appropriate governance. (For expanded 
applications, see Lempert and Nguyen, 2008.) 
Scoring: Yes - 1 
Debatable - 0.5 
No - 0 
Question 2*: 
Governance or Civil Society Functions Promoted are Appropriate Parts of the Key 
Governmental or Non-Governmental Organizational Missions through which there 
is Direct Public Accountability. The project is clearly designed to promote either a 
specific government function of protecting and/or promoting (separately and as a 
competing function in a structured system) an asset or resource of specific ethnic 
groups and of the country in ways that maintain or increase the per capita assets of 
the culture and the country, or to promote a non-governmental organization 
function that is specifically separate from government and which is directly 
accountable to all of its owner, consumer, neighbour stakeholders. There is a clear 
and measurable mission of accountable governance with measurable costs and 
benefits to specific units of public spending or resources for which specific 
government or non-government officials can be held directly accountable by 
citizens (removal, punishment, or rewards). Interventions that “promote regional 
integration” or “monitor foreign development funds” or “strengthen civil society” do 
not earn points. Government missions should be to “promote, measure, and 
maintain” assets. Those that “promote justice” or “improve health” or “protect 
resources” but do not assure that there are measurable benefits to specific cultures 
and/or per capita long-term improvement that are appropriate to their sustainability 
and adaptability, or that “develop” a resource without also protecting it, may 
actually distort effective governance systems and earn no points. 
Scoring: Yes - 1 
Debatable - 0.5 
No - 0 
Question 3: 
Full Framework Analysis Includes Three of the Multiple Dimensions or Levels of 
Capacity to Determine All of the Failures and their Relationships to Each Other. 
Regardless of any initial area that the project might pre-select as an intervention, 
the project withholds judgment on the nature of solutions or problem and conducts 
a full diagnosis to get at the root causes of the failures. The project design includes 
a thorough assessment of the multiple dimensions of “capacity” that includes all of 
the following as a key to understanding the human dimensions and behaviours that 
are the source of failures of systems to meet needs for sustainable development – 
1) the societal and cultural level, including ideologies, mal-adaptations to 
environmental changes, distributions of power and organization of political and 
                                                                                                         
43 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992) Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development. URL (consulted 17 June 2015): 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm. 
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legal institutions (including legacies of colonialism or current outside pressures) 
that interfere with sustainability; 2) failures at the organizational and institutional 
level for fulfilling specific missions; and 3) human resources failures. The analysis 
distinguishes symptoms from causes and also models how the entire system would 
work if it were returned or moved towards sustainability. There is commentary on 
the status of each of the four areas indicating whether or not there are failures at 
each level and determining with evidence whether or not specific areas can be 
approached independently to reach solutions or whether only comprehensive and 
linked solutions can achieve solutions to the problem and move towards a 
sustainable model. 
Scoring: Yes – 1 (All four of the levels are fully considered) 
Debatable - 0.5 (All four levels are considered but measures may 
be sloppy.) 
No - 0 
Question 4*: 
Root Cause Analysis and Problem Trees. The project focuses on those areas 
where there are failures and where specific and comprehensive changes can lead 
to measurable performance improvements. The project design includes a thorough 
assessment of the root causes for the failures that can be corrected through 
“building capacity.” Problems are mapped in a problem tree and the root causes of 
the problem, with identifiable target ACTORS whose behaviours need to be 
changed, are presented in a systematic and linked way. The potential intervention 
is tied directly to the problems at every one of the identified steps in the sequence 
where there are failures, with specific measurable outputs per unit of input at each 
stage, with particular attention to human behaviours at various levels to be 
changed that underlie the problem (rather than symptoms of weaknesses) that lead 
to measurable performance outcomes/results. Symptoms (low skills; lack of 
transparency or incentives, weak management, low resources) are not root 
causes, only individual and social and organizational behaviours are, and these are 
fully recognized in a problem statement and root cause analysis. The logframe 
shows specific measurable behaviour changes in cost savings, cost effectiveness, 
and other service delivery and social indicators, as direct output evidence of 
performance improvement outcomes, rather than simply throw inputs at a symptom 
and assume that there will be “better governance” or “improvement” or “greater 
capacity” or “more efficiency” because resources have been transferred.  
Scoring: Yes - 1 
Debatable - 0.5 
No – 0 (No problem statement or Root Cause or Problem Tree) 
Question 5*: 
Logframe Specifically Targets the Root Causes in an Appropriate Sequence, 
Showing How Specific Measured Inputs Lead to Specific Measured Performance 
Changes Over a Long Period of Time, with Cost Effectiveness Ratios of Inputs to 
Outputs Included Based on Benchmarks of Outcomes. The project logframe 
demonstrates specific measurable behaviour changes as outputs that lead to 
performance improvements, rather than simply throws inputs at symptoms and 
assumes that there will be “better governance” or “improvement” or “greater 
capacity” because resources have been transferred, documents have been drafted 
(laws, action plans or policies), agreements have been signed, people have been 
“trained,” or new offices or institutions have been established or tasked. Inputs are 
not turned into outputs because they are delivered or received or because 
something is to be produced. To earn points there must be clear benchmarks of 
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changed service delivery that are not simply accounting measures of delivery of 
inputs or intermediate inputs and there should be benchmarks linking units of 
spending to specific behavioural changes of specific numbers of a target 
population, with those specific behaviours leading to performance results that 
move a culture back to a path of sustainable development (living within its resource 
base). 
Scoring: Yes - 1 
Debatable - 0.5 
No – 0 (No cost benefit analysis of outputs; no logframe or 
logframe where inputs and outputs are confused and do not meet 
professional standards) 
Question 6: 
Public Accountability Mechanisms are Part of the Assessment (Fourth Principle of 
Capacity Building, in Analysis) and the Project Begins with Concern of Placing 
Capacity in Public Hands, Starting with Youth as the First and Priority Alternative of 
any Capacity Building Intervention. The project design includes a thorough 
assessment of the accountability of the systems to the public as a key to the social 
context. There is a focus on the laws, the incentives of officials, the feedback for 
funding, the monitoring of funds, and the public tasking and monitoring of results of 
the institutions for which capacity is to be “built.” There is a focus on increasing the 
capacity of the public, first, since all government and non-governmental functions 
and cultural decisions and understandings ultimately depend on the skills of the 
public. Building capacity of the public is considered first before any decision is 
made to work directly with the public’s agents or representatives, in order to ensure 
that specialists will be fully accountable to and controlled by the public. Projects to 
build civil society or governance start with assessments of the general skills, 
powers, and capacities in the population for such oversight and works to built them 
at the level of basic socializing institutions with young people, first, rather than with 
adults. The project clearly explains any decisions not to put all such skills and 
capacities into the public starting with youth and in models with youth (model civic 
actions and democratic governance of youth, model youth courts and public 
investigations, youth newspapers and NGOs, youth businesses, etc.) 
Scoring: Yes - 1 
Debatable - 0.5 
No - 0 
Question 7:  
Agreement is Transparent to Citizens and they are Included in the Project 
Oversight and Approval (Fourth Principle of Capacity Building, in Implementation). 
The project transfer of inputs to government or NGO stakeholders is conducted in 
ways that include screening and monitoring directly by citizens of the host 
population, including not only the direct approval of their legislative bodies but 
openness to media and outreach and inclusion of the public, so as to avoid any 
agreements that are government to government or bureaucrat to bureaucrat 
transfers. 
Scoring: Yes – 1, if the project shows awareness of this and protects 
against harm 
Debatable or not relevant - 0 
No – (-1) (Loss of a point) 
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1.b) Sustainability of the Impact through Systematization and Institutionalization: 
The Fifth Principle of Capacity Building and One Common to Other Development 
Interventions: The project doesn’t just seek short-term impact but institutionalizes a 
process of continued responsiveness and adjustments of capacity, as well as 
identification of needs and building of new capacity, in the governmental system 
and/or culture. (2 questions and a potential score of 2 points, to be awarded ONLY 
if the project has achieved a score of at least 4 points on the first 7 questions. 
Otherwise the measures are rewarding sustainability of a project that may actually 
undermine appropriate capacity building.) 
Question 8: 
Intervention Institutionalizes Change at the Root of the Problem, Fixing a Broken 
System, and is Not Funding an Institution or Activity for a Problem that Starts 
Elsewhere in the Society or Culture (e.g. Offering Remedial Training of Adults, 
Professionals or Employees). The project repairs a system failure (e.g., basic 
parental or public education for adult responsibilities; university education; 
professional education; a personnel selection system; salary structure; information 
system) and assures that is adaptive to change, for multi-generational continuing 
impact rather than offering a short term transfer or quick fix to one target 
stakeholder or recipient group. An education problem in skills, an awareness or 
consciousness issue, an issue of funding or overall behaviours, is traced back to 
family socialization and the formal and informal (media) education system with a 
focus on changing those for the long term rather than simply treating the symptom 
by working with adults. 
Scoring: Yes - 1 
Debatable - 0.5 
No - 0 
Question 9*: 
Sustainability of the intervention and Impact. The Intervention Builds a Continuing 
System of Measurement, Monitoring, Determining of Actual Need and Value, and 
Appropriate Advocacy and Receipt of Future Funding. The intervention has built 
institutional mechanisms that are self-sustainable within the country’s resources 
and have continued local financing and management, with freedom from continued 
foreign or institutional funding that would create dependency on outsiders for 
achievement of the project goals. The project builds and institutionalizes an in-
country monitoring system of capacity and of costs and benefits in the services that 
are being supported, such that the system adapts to changing conditions and 
measures (with adequate oversight to assure no conflicts of interest in the data) 
that there is appropriate advocacy for funds and receipt of support in an effective 
balance with other competing systems through a fair process. There is a specific 
determination of “how much” capacity is needed to solve a particular problem and 
at a measurable cost, with costs and benefits considered to the country and how 
the country will be able to pay for it out of the stream of future benefits. It is not just 
considered to be good for its own sake, without justification.  
Scoring: Yes - 1 
Debatable - 0.5 
No - 0 
1.c) Internal Procedures of the Project, Itself, Reflect the Values of Accountability 
and Self-Reliance: The project organization is itself a model of good governance, 
accountability, efficiency, transparency and appropriate capacity (2 questions and 
a potential score of 2 points but also a potential loss of 2 points if the project itself 
sends a message that contradicts and undermines what it claims to be achieving) 
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Question 10: 
Accountability of the donors: The project itself (the donor organization) is a model 
of transparency and direct accountability to beneficiaries and to citizens, and does 
not hide behind barriers that require citizens or beneficiaries to demand that 
government representatives or other elites bestow accountability. Projects that 
meet this requirement will have open books, clear professional ethics codes, full 
published reports on their projects, and full use of measurement tools of benefits in 
the profession (cost-benefit, baselines, comparative indicators, and industry 
benchmarks). Moreover, the donor organization, itself, has conducted the very 
same capacity analysis subject to the same questions as in this test, to assure that 
it has a clear and strategic mission, that its own results are measurable with 
benchmarks and cost effectiveness data, that its employees meet specific tests of 
certified competence in their fields, that evaluations are done independently and 
objectively not with management oversight but with the oversight of funders and 
beneficiary stakeholders, with results available and with feedback systems that 
assure accountability and implementation of the results. 
Scoring: Yes – 1, if the project shows awareness of this and protects 
against harm 
Debatable or not relevant - 0 
No – (-1) (Loss of a point) 
Question 11:   
Rewards and Incentives: The project rewards behaviours that promote 
independence and sustainability of recipients and punishes behaviours that 
promote dependency or donor relationships, with no opportunity for collusion to 
prolong funding in the absence of meeting stringent conditions for results, 
established in advance. Delayed projects are not rewarded because of good 
“relationships” have been built and officials or beneficiaries “appreciate” the 
assistance, but because there are clear standards showing progress towards 
measurable results and sustainability and that exceed standard benchmarks for 
projects resolving similar root causes of the problems. Grants are given with real 
conditions that have enforceability and consequences without paternalistic 
justifications that recipients cannot or should not be held to real standards. 
Success of a project does not lead to replication in additional areas using more 
outside funds but towards promotion of copying by others with their own resources. 
Failure of a project to be sustainable or to show strong benefits does not invite 
additional funding because of “continued poverty” or “need” but triggers an 
immediate change and possible liability. The original setting of conditions on the 
project meets the most stringent of international treaty standards, benchmarks and 
objectives and was not simply a politically negotiated transfer of support to facilitate 
project inception. 
Scoring: Yes – 1, if the project shows awareness of this and protects 
against harm 
Debatable or not relevant - 0 
No – (-1) (Loss of a point) 
2. Professional Safeguards are in Place Against Conflicts of Interest and Against 
Unintended Consequences that could Distort other Public or Private Systems: 
These questions are challenge tests to assure that the design process is actually 
being used in ways that it is supposed to work. For this reason, scoring here is 
negative, subtracting points for failures. Questions are in two categories: 4 
questions on conflicts of interest and 5 questions on negative impacts on public 
and private systems. (9 questions and a potential loss of 9 points) 
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2.a) The “Capacity Building” Tool is One Tool to Fit an Objectively Measured 
Sustainable Development Need, Rather than a Tool Searching for a Need Where it 
Can Be Used or as a Political Facilitator of Some Other Transfer: No Conflicts of 
Interest: The project is not subject to the influence of any stakeholder groups in its 
design or implementation other than determinations of independent professionals 
held directly accountable to ethics standards (4 questions and a potential loss of 4 
points) 
Question 12:   
Assessment of the Need is Protected Against Subjective Biases of the Partners/ 
Stakeholder Recipients. The project clearly distinguishes the difference between 
sustainable development “needs” and partner/stakeholder “wants.” Needs for 
capacity building are assessed as relevant to fixing a root cause of a development 
problem with failures assessed before the project begins and before any funds are 
committed, using independent, objective measures such as skills testing, 
production and service analyses, monitoring of performance and outputs, strategic 
management tools (for potential consulting inputs), etc. The project is not a Santa 
Claus, measuring its success with “smile sheets” of how happy partners or 
stakeholder recipients are to receive support and asking them to measure their 
“needs” with questionnaires or group meetings (what they would “like to learn” or 
where they could “use consultants”) in ways that offer funds first and then seek to 
justify their transfer with the subjective or political determinations.  
Scoring: Yes – 0 (no loss of points), if the project shows awareness of this 
and protects against harm 
No explicit policy at the organization to protect against this, but no 
clear sign that abuse has occurred – (-0.5) (Loss of half of a point) 
No, and there are signs that this abuse has occurred or is very 
likely to occur – (-1) (Loss of a point) 
Question 13:  
Delivery of Inputs Does Not Personally Benefit the Stakeholders/Partners but 
Benefits Everyone in the Society/Culture Equally. The project includes no incentive 
payments in the form of perquisites to convince or ease participation of officials 
(per diems or other payments that are above salary; travel and tours; scholarships 
and education resulting in degrees or certificates that can be used in other jobs; 
vehicles, computers, or other office equipment). Anything delivered is measured in 
a specific test of benefits to the country versus benefits to the implementing 
stakeholders. Such payments and transfers are also those that members of the 
public are informed about and approve. 
Scoring: Yes – 0 (no loss of points), if the project shows awareness of this 
and protects against harm 
No explicit policy at the organization to protect against this, but no 
clear sign that abuse has occurred – (-0.5) (Loss of half of a point) 
No, and there are signs that this abuse has occurred or is very 
likely to occur – (-1) (Loss of a point) 
Question 14: 
There are No Linked Inputs or Grant Funds for Officials to Manage that do Not 
Directly Improve Capacity for Already Existing Budgets and Target Root Causes of 
Capacity Failures Rather than Symptoms. The project includes no pump priming 
grants to government agencies that increases their existing budgets without 
starting directly on the root causes of administrative system failures. Anything 
delivered is measured in a specific test of solving the problem of current lack of 
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capacity for managing existing budgets or for making the case for increased 
taxation rather than as a sweetener that could hide another objective. Questions 
are asked immediately about why the agency currently does not tax effectively for 
funds if they do lead to public benefit, or why they have not closed loopholes of 
corruption or established appropriate development priorities, before anything is 
given to a partner to manage. 
Scoring: Yes – 0 (no loss of points), if the project shows awareness of this 
and protects against harm 
No explicit policy at the organization to protect against this, but no 
clear sign that abuse has occurred – (-0.5) (Loss of half of a point) 
No, and there are signs that this abuse has occurred or is very 
likely to occur – (-1) (Loss of a point) 
Question 15: 
Screening and Delineation of All Conflicts of Interest of International “Partner” 
Organizations for “Twinning” Projects, for Consultants and International Firms, and 
of all Implementing and Donor Agents/ Stakeholders is Combined with Legal and 
Ethical Oversight. The project documents all possible biases and benefits to the 
participating partners, donor agents, and donor staff to assure that there are no 
future financial or personal benefit conflicts of interest beyond pure humanitarian 
goals driving projects or methods for specific benefits to stakeholders that are in 
any conflict with the funders and/or the public beneficiaries that drive project 
decisions in any way. Strict mechanisms are in place for outside challenges, for 
review, and for stopping projects or penalizing offenders for any such conflicts. 
Scoring: Yes – 0 (no loss of points), if the project shows awareness of this 
and protects against harm 
No explicit policy at the organization to protect against this, but no 
clear sign that abuse has occurred – (-0.5) (Loss of half of a point) 
No, and there are signs that this abuse has occurred or is very 
likely to occur – (-1) (Loss of a point) 
2.b) No Negative or Adverse Impacts on the Political/Government System or on 
Related Private Systems: The project does not distort the overall governmental 
system or the roles or balance of governmental or non-governmental (business 
and community based) institutions but supports their appropriate roles. (5 
questions and a potential loss of 5 points) 
Question 16:  
Citizen powers and enforceable protections are Strengthened as the Initial and 
Linked Goal and Result of All Interventions, with Real Safeguards Against 
Transferring new powers to officials or to large private organizations (business or 
civil society, including foreign government, business and NGO actors) in the Name 
of Citizen Protection, or any other changes making decisions more opaque or 
hierarchical. The project does not increase the power of officials or designated 
representatives over citizens (e.g., supporting strengthening of an “institution” that 
empowers its officials such as Parliament or an “Ombudsman” or “Prosecutor” 
rather than increasing the role of the public using the government function, such as 
empowering the public with legislative power and skills, increasing public ability to 
sue and remove government officials and to be the judicial deciders, or allowing for 
class action suits and other “private prosecutor” mechanisms.) The intervention 
does not create new public bureaucracies without a real change in citizen power. 
Scoring: Yes – 0 (no loss of points), if the project shows awareness of this 
and protects against harm 
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No explicit policy at the organization to protect against this, but no 
clear sign that abuse has occurred – (-0.5) (Loss of half of a point) 
No, and there are signs that this abuse has occurred or is very 
likely to occur – (-1) (Loss of a point) 
Question 17: 
Interventions do not Improve Efficiency of Systems that May be Undemocratic, 
Inequitable or Unjust but Begin with a Focus on Accountability, Participation, and 
Equity. The project recognizes the danger of “efficiency” of systems that are 
inherently unrepresentative and does not simply promote efficiency given the 
potential for continued rights abuses by an authoritarian or unaccountable regime. 
Projects working with businesses, community based organizations or any aspects 
of government where decisions are made (particularly the justice system but also 
Parliament and any Ministries with discretionary and/or policy authority) work to link 
efficiency interventions directly with equity and direct citizen control (removal, 
sanctions, legal challenges, equal participation as jurors). 
Scoring: Yes – 0 (no loss of points), if the project shows awareness of this 
and protects against harm 
No explicit policy at the organization to protect against this, but no 
clear sign that abuse has occurred – (-0.5) (Loss of half of a point) 
No, and there are signs that this abuse has occurred or is very 
likely to occur – (-1) (Loss of a point) 
Question 18:  
Donor-to-Stakeholder Beneficiary Financial Transfers (Grant, Loan, Gift) or 
Commitments that are Given as Part of “Capacity Building” Do Not Create Future 
Obligations in Ways that Could Subsidize a Favoured Social Group, Distort Taxes, 
or Negatively Influence Priorities for Sustainability. The project meets strict public 
finance criteria for grant, loan/investment, or subsidy and funds are allocated 
appropriately, with public oversight to assure that any loans are approved by the 
public and that the public is able and willing to pay for each item that is linked to 
“capacity building.” The impact of the assistance does not end up subsidizing some 
other improper spending (allowing a transfer from one category of spending into 
something else as a result of the gift), reducing pressure on elites who should tax 
themselves to fund the project, or end up distorting capital markets in the country 
by offering a gift or subsidy for a kind of productive investment that should be in the 
form of a loan or in the form of a loan at competitive market rates. If the project 
merely seeks to find “poor” people to help by building the “capacity” to help them, 
but does not analyze the responsibility of the elites in the country to fulfill 
obligations of social solidarity with people in their own country, the project is part of 
a collusion in detaching elites globally from their local responsibilities and has a 
negative impact. If the project does not do an analysis of existing government 
spending and tax policies, it is likely that the project is offering money for the “poor” 
at the same time that an excessive amount of the budget is being used for military 
and police spending to control the poor, and the project is actually subsidizing this 
pattern. If the project includes a gift rather than a loan and does not include 
standard financial controls and conditions, it is likely being given with the 
knowledge that corruption will occur and as a subsidy for corruption and waste, 
including purchase of luxuries and foreign goods. 
Scoring: Yes – 0 (no loss of points), if the project shows awareness of this 
and protects against harm 
No explicit policy at the organization to protect against this, but no 
clear sign that abuse has occurred – (-0.5) (Loss of half of a point) 
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No, and there are signs that this abuse has occurred or is very 
likely to occur – (-1) (Loss of a point) 
Question 19: 
Government functions are respected and the balance with civil society is promoted 
appropriately and internally, with effective public regulation of the non-
governmental sectors. The intervention does not replace a government function 
with foreign paternalism building parallel systems that are better than government 
but that do not improve what is wrong, or transfer a government function to another 
place like civil society because of current underperformance. Nor does the project 
seek to build a civil society that must rely on funds from donors or from elites, in 
place of direct support and control by the beneficiaries, themselves. Nor does it 
seek to build a strong private sector without effective public regulation of that 
sector and restrictions on the powers it could exert through financial pressures. 
(NGOs are not public service providers but provide for private needs and have a 
role in trying to improve government action; businesses are not “corporate citizens” 
but are producers to be taxed and regulated to fund public functions, etc. The 
appropriate role of an NGO is to model a new behaviour to try to convince 
government to change, and to advocate for the special interests of a group with 
sustainable funding and accountability to that beneficiary group, but not reliant on 
foreign or other outside funding. The appropriate role of funding for NGOs must 
also be to ensure that they are sustainable with funding from the beneficiaries and 
with accountability directly to the beneficiaries, and not dependent on funds from 
foreigners or from elites who are disconnected to benefits to the beneficiaries and 
who have different interests.) 
Scoring: Yes – 0 (no loss of points), if the project shows awareness of this 
and protects against harm 
No explicit policy at the organization to protect against this, but no 
clear sign that abuse has occurred – (-0.5) (Loss of half of a point) 
No, and there are signs that this abuse has occurred or is very 
likely to occur – (-1) (Loss of a point) 
Question 20: 
The Intervention Promotes Competition Among Providers in the Area where 
Capacity is Built and Does Not Distort Market Systems. The project seeks to build 
the infrastructure in society for government consulting, training systems/ 
educational institutions, information systems and other organizations that public 
institutions can hire and fund through competitive bids, and does not seek to 
monopolize a particular training or provide it directly where such services can be 
provided. Donors do not pick “winner” NGOs or businesses or agencies to receive 
support in ways that could disfavour competitors from developing. An assessment 
is done at the beginning of the project of the means of developing this kind of 
service market for the capacity needs of governmental and non-governmental 
organizations (following a Business Development Services (BDS) model). 
Scoring: Yes – 0 (no loss of points), if the project shows awareness of this 
and protects against harm 
No explicit policy at the organization to protect against this, but no 
clear sign that abuse has occurred – (-0.5) (Loss of half of a point) 
No, and there are signs that this abuse has occurred or is very 
likely to occur – (-1) (Loss of a point) 
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2.5. How some organizations do 
After understanding how the indicator works, it is easy to apply to every new case 
in just a few minutes and with close agreement among anyone using it. In the 
Appendix, in Section IV, are several examples including many of the standard 
approaches that are now widespread in the field, showing how different 
organizations and projects score, from best to worst. Rather than score specific 
projects in particular countries, some of the projects are generalized in project 
categories that are common in the field, showing the range of scores that they earn 
depending on which particular features are included in certain types of projects by 
specific donors and proponents. 
3. Post-script: solutions 
The irony of exposing the flaws in development projects today is that the “experts” 
who are in the position to make changes have little incentive to change, while 
those who are best protected by change are the least informed and organized 
about where or how to begin to push for reforms. An indicator can facilitate change, 
but like other improved tools, it must be in the hands of those willing and able to 
use it. 
Organizations that score the worst on the new indicator in this article will likely not 
even recognize their failures. (They are likely to say that professional compliance 
standards do not apply or that projects are “too diverse” or that measurement is 
“too difficult” or “subjective”. They may say that this business-like approach that 
introduces a variety of professional expertise takes the artistry and “humanistic” or 
“human” judgment out of their work, though in fact it does the opposite by applying 
their own standards to their work. They are likely to respond defensively to 
suggestions for more public oversight of their work and to claim that accountability 
is a form of “policing,” even though they accept the idea of “accountability” as one 
of the key principles of effective capacity building. They are likely to say that 
oversight implies “mistrust” and that their good faith is being questioned, in the 
premise that they are above the law and the public is (by their design) ignorant and 
uninformed about what they do. They may say that holding a government official 
accountable for results is unfair because there are “too many factors”) 
Overall, such responses from many “professionals” in “good governance” will 
demonstrate exactly why many of the people in place in current systems are part of 
the problem and not the solution. Indeed, the only real solution is mobilization of 
the public.  
This author has suggested the formation of Donor Monitor NGOs that act as public 
advocates (Lempert, 2008) and has designed a full set of other governance 
reforms in media, organizational oversight, private attorneys general and other 
citizen powers that would promote professionalism and accountability at the level 
of constitutional changes (Lempert, 1997) as well as educational and cultural 
reforms. But who will fund and promote them?  
In short, foxes have entered the henhouse in design and implementation of 
capacity building projects in international development as well as many other 
governmental systems, and there is a need to devise better oversight systems. The 
only way that change can really occur is if those public voices who have an interest 
in the oversight act collectively to protect their interests. In the case of capacity 
building for “governance” those interests are a stable and democratic world as well 
as control over billions of dollars in public money that is diverted.  
This article offers one tool, a weapon of empowerment, to at least facilitate that 
effort, as part of a codification of laws and standards that could ultimately be 
enforceable both by those paying for the interventions and those at the receiving 
end. This indicator takes away excuses that oversight is too difficult for ordinary 
citizens and that we must simply wait, pray, and rely on experts to change in ways 
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they have little incentive to change, rather than to take on the burdens of 
citizenship to protect the public interest in promoting effective, efficient and law 
abiding development interventions. 
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APPENDIX 
Section I: Principles of "capacity building" 
Two long-standing definitions offered by two major international donor 
organizations, UNDP and the European Commission, dating back 10 to 20 years, 
touch on what are essentially five key elements for capacity building in working 
with foreign governments and civil society in development. These key elements are 
highlighted in the text with numbers, with the first three relating to the three critical 
levels at which capacity building interventions must operate and the fourth referring 
to a principle of good governance. Indeed, they come out of the development 
literature going back at least thirty years (Honadle, 1981). 
UNDP (1991) defined 'capacity building' as: 
1) the creation of an enabling environment with appropriate policy and legal 
frameworks,  
2) institutional development, including community participation (of women in 
particular),  
3) human resources development and strengthening of managerial systems. 
4) UNDP recognizes that capacity building is a long-term, continuing process, in 
which all stakeholders participate (ministries, local authorities, non-
governmental organizations and water user groups, professional associations, 
academics and others). 
The European Commission definition highlights these four areas with a particular 
emphasis on the aspects of accountability to the public (the fourth category above): 
‘To develop and strengthen structures, institutions and procedures that help to 
ensure: transparent and accountable governance in all public institutions; improve 
capacity to analyze, plan, formulate and implement policies in economic, social, 
environmental, research, science and technology fields; and in critical areas such 
as international negotiation.’ (World Bank, 2005:26). 
Several documents of major international donor organizations have elaborated on 
these four areas, above, in documents that are readily available and repeated in 
multiple UNDP, World Bank, and other sources, including even Wikipedia’s page 
for ‘capacity development.’ The wording is sometimes a bit different, but the 
concepts are the same. To help make the jargon for the three different levels of 
organizational performance intelligible, the terms can be clustered as follows.  
 The ‘enabling environment’ – the legal and political authority, resources and 
incentives, for an organization to fulfill its legal, public, established purpose - is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘institutional capacity’ (slightly confusing it with 
‘institutional development’) to denote the “rules of the game”; the legal or 
cultural environment in which organizations are constrained and directed 
(World Bank, 2005). The UNDP refers to this as the ‘broader system/societal 
level’ or ‘systems level’ (UNDP, 1998). Added to legal and regulatory 
framework and policy concerns are issues of resources, management, and 
accountability. Major donors do not often use the word “culture” (sometimes 
they use the euphemism, “social capital” to assume that all societies are on a 
single path to development and simply lack certain aspects), but of course the 
cultural fit of a particular institutional function is a necessary part of an analysis 
of a sustainable system in the development context and is part of a complete 
analysis of the operating environment. 
 “Institutional development” for effective and efficient management is 
sometimes defined as ‘organizational development’ or ‘organizational capacity’ 
(World Bank, 2005) with ‘institution’ referring to the overall political or 
government system as an institution and parts within it or alongside it (private 
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businesses or community based organizations) as the ‘organizations’ or 
‘entities’ (UNDP, 1998). The capacity building work here is that applied 
regularly in the business and community based organization (CBO) sectors to 
improve efficiency and performance through strategic planning and 
improvement of mission as well as building institutional resources and applying 
effective financial and organizational management, staffing, accounting and 
control, including the quality of feedback and evaluation systems. 
 “Human resources” (skills) is sometimes referred to as ‘human capacity’ (World 
Bank, 2005:27). The UNDP also refers to this as the ‘group of people 
level/individual development’ (UNDP, 1998). Sometimes ‘education and 
training’ is also further elaborated as skills, information and perspectives (three 
sub-areas) that can all be objectively tested and tied to performance.  
 In addition to the three levels above and accountability to the public, most 
definitions implicitly offer a fifth category; that of the long term sustainability of 
the capacity to perform the necessary function and the ability to attract 
resources to assure that sustainability. A UNDP definition made it clear that 
capacity was part of a: 
5) ‘continuing process’ whereby individuals or organizations units perform 
functions ‘sustainably’ as well as effectively and efficiently (UNDP, 1998:10). 
Others reiterate this as ‘the attraction, management and absorption of resources’ 
(Honadle, 1981) or as an ‘ongoing and sustainable fashion’ (Elton Consulting, 
2002) or with the flexibility to deal continually with a changing environment. 
There is also an understanding that these five elements must all be taken together. 
The UNDP makes clear that, ‘Capacity building should be seen as a 
comprehensive methodology aiming to provide a sustainable outcome through 
assessing and addressing a whole range of relevant issues and their 
interrelationships’ with none of these areas to be viewed alone (UNDP 1998). 
These elements and their relationship are presented in the chart below. 
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Figure: The Five Key Principles of Capacity Building 
 
In conducting capacity building with non-profit organizations, consulting firms like 
McKinsey have introduced other frameworks that highlight concerns using different 
words but essentially reiterate the three ‘systems levels’ along with other elements 
like ‘culture,’ ‘strategy,’ ‘aspirations’ (mission and vision) and ‘organizational 
management’ that are already included components of the framework above 
(McKinsey, 2001). 
That, in itself, is the basic standard of the tool. Like any tool, it also must be part of 
an established set of routine procedures for development interventions. There are 
a variety of studies of capacity building by donors that simply put them within the 
context of ordinary procedures for results based management, appropriate 
measures of the problems to be solved, the root causes of the problems, use of 
logframes to match interventions to steps in the root causes of problems, and use 
of standard cost-benefit analysis procedures and baselines to assure efficient use 
of resources to achieve measurable results promoting appropriate development 
objectives (Boesen and Therkildsen (Danida), 2004; Boesen, Christensen and 
Therkildsen, 2002). This is also essentially what the World Bank evaluations and 
various UNDP evaluations refer to when they fault their organizations for not 
applying the standard procedures of the field to these particular tools (UNDP, 
1998, 2002, 2004; World Bank, 2000, 2005; Acharya and Wright, 2000; Linnell, 
2003). 
As evaluators have noted, there is nothing magical about capacity building. It 
simply requires following standard technical practices that are well established in 
the fields of public administration, law, general business management (strategic 
planning, personnel management, accounting for managerial control). These are 
basic textbook skills. 
 
 
1. Policy and Legal 
framework
 
3.  Human capacity 

2.  Institutional 
Development/ 
Management efficiency 
 
Organizational Function:   
3 levels of capacity 
5.  Sustainability 4. Public Accountability 
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There is certainly room for difference on achieving higher quality or applying new 
techniques for better results, as in all specialized and technical fields. But the key 
criticisms that have been launched in this field are not over the use of innovative 
new practices. They are simply about whether the most basic standards are being 
applied. And these can very easily be stated, referenced in standard texts, and put 
into an indicator to see whether they are being followed. 
Just as in medical practice, a standard diagnosis requires certain tests, adherence 
to certain standards of cleanliness, patient ethics and care, and drug protocols, the 
basic test of competence is whether these are all followed. Once the basics are 
adhered to for licensing purposes, then there can be disagreements about new 
tests and procedures and their value. At this stage with “capacity building,” 
however, we are still at the basic stages simply of establishing whether 
practitioners meet the basic “licensing” standards for establishing minimal 
competence. 
Given that organizations have already defined the goals and purposes of capacity 
building and given that the procedures for design and evaluation of development 
interventions is also routine, it is relatively simple to run through a checklist to 
determine whether all of these elements are actually being followed or not in any 
specific project intervention and for holding development actors accountable. So 
why has no one sought to, or been able to do it? 
Section II: Indicators in the field and the lack of an indicator for 
“capacity development” interventions 
Practitioners have sought to create measurements for what is most difficult and 
what is fraught with political and disciplinary issues, but they have yet to offer a 
measurement in the area where there is already political and professional 
agreement; over whether their own activities comply with legal and professional 
standards; something that can be determined with a simple checklist. 
Political scientists and development organizations have created a series of 
indicators to measure whether countries as a whole have the attributes of “good 
governance” that industrialized donor nations (politically) determine reflect the 
appropriate standard. These generally seek to measure the quality of governance 
in their entirety and in the aggregate, but without looking at whether specific 
projects actually improve governance and meet international standards (defined in 
United Nations treaties) for sustainably protecting cultural or community assets. For 
example, the World Bank’s devised indicator uses a definition of governance that 
reflects its own goals of effectively managing the loans it gives to government 
officials to ensure that the Bank’s objectives are adhered to. The indicator 
aggregates subjective views on ‘voice and accountability, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption’ 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 1997). Similarly, Freedom House, a U.S. 
government funded organization, measures whether certain processes meet their 
subjective standards in seven areas: (electoral process; civil society; independent 
media; national democratic governance; local democratic governance; judicial 
framework and independence; and corruption) and scores whether a country is 
‘democratic’ according to its own cultural preferences, rather than whether 
governance is effective in meeting local needs or even if it is in keeping with 
international law. A country could score well on this index but still destroy all of its 
minorities or sell all of its resources in violation of international treaties (Freedom 
House, 2006).) 
A number of other indicators that are used in political science data sets do not 
seem to be used at all by development organizations and do not have direct 
applicability to measuring the quality of capacity building. These indicators rank 
countries (Polity IV; Marshall et al, 2006), pick specific attributes (Polyarchy 1.2 
that measures ‘competitiveness and political participation’ (Vanhanen, 2000); 
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generates an ‘index of democracy’ based on five categories (used by The 
Economist magazine, Kekic, 2007)) or substitutes goals of economic 
transformation that are in direct contradiction to the fundamental principles of good 
governance that require protecting assets and promoting sustainability 
(Bertelsmann Transformation Index in Stiftung Bertelsmann, 2006). 
Though one might expect practitioners to have clear and simple indicators to 
support and justify program spending, the reality is that the development 
bureaucracies seem to be even more confused (or politicized) in setting the goals 
of governance and capacity building interventions than political scientists and in 
agreeing on what to measure.  
Among development organizations, the one that has come closest to developing 
an indicator for ‘capacity building’ is the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID). USAID’s failure in this area, however, is that it does not start with a basic 
indicator for ‘capacity building’ or governance initiatives but tries instead to define 
every kind of outcome or outcome measure they would like to see for specific 
interventions. In other words, they substitute individual trees for the goal of 
protecting a forest. For example, USAID’s measure of effective capacity building in 
the training of officials is whether or not it leads to ‘Elected officials who have been 
trained’ (a restatement of the input), ‘and who say that they are using their new 
skills on the job’ with ‘examples of how they are using it’ (USAID, 1988, page 166). 
Indeed, as an effective measure, this one violates the basic principles of 
governance since it turns an input (training) into the measured output and offers 
only subjective reports from stakeholders with no objective measures of improved 
performance to citizen beneficiaries. This is more an example of what is wrong 
than an attempt to provide measures. Though USAID also mentions that it would 
be useful to measure the ‘skill level’ of ‘salaried staff,’ this also has no relation to 
performances and outcomes. To put it more bluntly, the increased efficiency of an 
authoritarian or fascist regime in its executions, due to higher skill level, would 
receive high marks on a USAID indicator. So would simple bribes to government 
officials or indoctrination that was disguised as ‘training.’ A more recent document 
on ‘USAID’s Approach to Monitoring Capacity Building Activities’ simply offers 
some formulaic suggestions such as: ‘Avoid broad statements,’ ‘Be inclusive’ and 
‘Be selective’ (Muller, 2007). A USAID review of recent indicators showed little in 
the way of other approaches (Measure, 1999).  
Rather than offer indicators, most development organizations simply offer 
checklists of ideas to consider when doing “capacity building.” These can more 
easily be described as a set of cookbook recipes than as a legal means of applying 
standards of accountability. Organizations offering this “recipe” approach are the 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank (Ogiogio, 2005; Otoo et al, 2009), the U. 
N. system (that also offers national surveys of public perceptions rather than any 
objective professional standards, Landman, 2006; UNDP 2004), and the European 
Union (EC, 2002; 2001; EC undated, pre-2003). In many of these documents the 
definitions are circular and the goals become ‘partnerships’ and ‘policy’ 
improvement without any measurable content. 
Among the most recent of these, one published by the World Bank Institute, there 
is still confusion between the tool of “capacity building” and any kind of 
development intervention, as well as between the content delivered and the form of 
delivery. The ‘Capacity Development Results Framework’ is described as doing 
everything that development does – ‘design, implementation, monitoring, 
management, and evaluation of development projects’ – in ways that are so broad 
as to make it useless (Otoo et al, 2009). Such ‘frameworks’ do not start with 
analysis of the problem, with problem trees, as a diagnostic for lack of capacity but 
seek to cover everything, including country-wide programme cycles, ‘national 
development strategies, 5-year plans, and visions for the future’ (Otoo et al, 
2009:11). Essentially, in place of examination of capacity building, they have 
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substituted frameworks for how to create logical frameworks for any kind of 
development intervention through any kind of modality. 
Moreover, most of the “framework” (rather than “measurement”) literature comes 
from publications of the donors, themselves, with little outside to create 
accountability. Indeed, there still does not appear to be even one international 
journal devoted to “capacity building” anywhere. The result is that the real 
problems in the field, of hidden agendas for corruption and dependency, are never 
examined other than in vague euphemisms to protect those responsible, using 
bureaucratic jargon like ‘unintended negative consequences’ and lack of ‘clarity of 
mission’ or lack of ‘supportiveness of stakeholders’ among a long list of ‘capacity 
factors’ (Otoo et al, 2009:12). At best, the focus is only on ‘educational impact 
analysis’. The problems remain hidden, by design. 
Similarly, a number of diagnostics have been developed in the actual practice of 
“capacity building,” mostly with community based organizations (McKinsey, 2001; 
Christensen et. al., undated; Gubbels and Koss, 2000; Lusthaus et al, 2002). 
Mostly these parallel and actualize approaches that in the business literature would 
be called ‘strategic management’ or ‘accounting for management control’ 
(Emmanuel, Merchant and Otley, 1990). However, they have yet to be applied as 
accountability tools to the billions of dollars in international interventions. 
It is ironic that while there are two recent international treaties that guide 
international interventions and reference the idea of standards – the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008)44, 
now followed and reinforced by the International Aid Transparency Initiative signed 
in Busan (2011) – they offer few specifics and little enforcement, thus reflecting the 
exact problems they claim they are trying to solve.  
With so much effort to develop “indicators,” the fact that none of them seem to do 
what is so simple seems to suggest how deeply rooted are the cultural and 
institutional barriers to holding even governments in Western “democracies” 
accountable for billions of dollars of public spending. 
Section III: The problem with many “capacity building” projects 
and the real value of an indicator  
The World Bank and other organizations’ evaluations readily admit the problems of 
current capacity building approaches, though they do so euphemistically. It is easy 
to take their own words and to expose what is going on in simpler language. What 
the donors’ own internal critics have exposed is that project fail because donors 
want them to fail to protect other agendas and because major international 
organizations are using “capacity building” as a cover to bribe or co-opt officials for 
foreign agendas. One World Bank study admitted both the goals and the 
mechanisms of how this works, noting that ‘governments generally are inclined to 
improve services demanded by powerful interests’ and then noting specifically that 
it is ‘donors’ payments’ that ‘subordinate the coherence of the machinery of 
government to the narrower goal [and] short term gains … of project 
implementation’ for the donors (World Bank, 2000:41).  
The mechanisms are also clear. Often the corruption that foreign donors claim they 
are seeking to stop are actually initiated or reinforced by donors themselves, with 
“capacity building” one of the ways of buying off of government officials directly 
through what the World Bank itself admits are ‘donors’ payments of salary 
supplements’ (i.e., what could be seen as the equivalent of illegal bribes under the 
                                                                                                         
44 Accra Agenda for Action (2008) URL (consulted 17 June 2015): 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/4700790-1217425866038/ACCRA_4_ 
SEPTEMBER_FINAL_16h00.pdf. 
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U.N. Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery45), in addition to ‘grants and 
concessional loans’ to ‘encourage line ministries … to “market” to donors’ (World 
Bank, 2000:41). The World Bank notes that the approach is usually to exclude the 
public, ‘interacting exclusively with government interlocutors’ while disguising 
bribes in the form of ‘computers and other inputs’ where it is obvious that no 
changes in services will occur because of ‘the absence of deep and sustainable 
demand for institutional reform.’ Moreover, they note that, ‘This applies to much of 
the donor community’ (World Bank, 2000:14). Indeed, this reinforces what the 
previous indicators designed by this author to test foreign projects for 
‘dependency/colonialism,’ ‘sustainability,’ and ‘democracy’ helped reveal; that 
many of the large donors are in fact continuing to pursue a colonial agenda with 
little oversight or accountability and the creation of tools that hide their underlying 
intent (Lempert, 2009a, 2011; Lempert and Nguyen, 2008). 
Most often the Ministries or government organizations to be ‘built’ (what many 
observers would view as a euphemism for co-opted with foreign gifts, funds and 
advisors) are the Ministry of Planning and Investment, to serve as a (dependent or 
‘colonial’) intermediary of international investment banks (Mayo, 2009), the 
Judiciary in order to protect international businesses; the Parliament in order to 
write the laws that open their economies and systems to foreign businesses and 
other influences and then to promote these changes to the public; the head 
Ministers in order to write the development plans and policies and claim they are 
domestic aspirations rather than foreign driven; Ministry of Health to stop 
contagious diseases from leaving the country, etc. The goal in building capacity in 
the non-governmental sector is often to generate business joint ventures to the 
benefit of foreign business, to influence current and emerging leaders of political 
parties while improving their ability to manipulate their citizenry to support foreign 
agendas, and to build a foreign funded rather than locally accountable or 
sustainable civil society to lobby for foreign interests (generally for foreign 
investment; often for ‘women’s rights’ as a way to destroy traditional practices and 
free women for work in export processing zones or as administrators for the foreign 
sector) (Lempert, 2009a, 2012). In the author’s experience over 30 years, in almost 
all of these projects, the public is excluded by design and “accountability” is really 
accountability to the agenda of the donors, not of any parts of government to 
citizen oversight, and the amount of secrecy has actually been increasing with 
consultants forced to sign statements of confidentiality that the author, as a lawyer, 
believes to be in direct violation of most public transparency laws (Lempert, 
2009b). As the World Bank itself noted, the public ‘voice’ is systematically excluded 
(World Bank, 2000:43). 
The fact that this happens is an open secret with little or no influence either from 
the taxpayer/donor public or from the publics in countries where the projects are 
being run. In fact, most international development organizations have now 
established secrecy clauses (in violation of public laws in both donor and recipient 
countries) to hide information about these projects under the pretext that officials in 
recipient countries would not candidly discuss their capacity “needs” if they 
believed the public might learn of their incompetence and fallibility. Some vignettes 
taken from some actual projects in which the author is familiar (in the section 
below) highlight the absurdities and flagrant abuses that now occur. In presenting 
these cases, the author draws on professional experience and participant observer 
methodologies used in the field of social anthropology as well as determinations 
applying methodologies of law and public administration. 
The mechanisms that cloak these bribes as “capacity building” are relatively 
transparent and are easy to reveal with a good indicator that exposes lack of 
                                                                                                         
45 U.N. Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions (1996): 
A/RES/51/191. URL (consulted 17 June 2015): http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r191.htm 
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safeguards against conflicts of interest of donors themselves, and of recipient 
government “stakeholders” and the lack of transparency has nothing to do with 
encouraging reform and everything to do with covering up the abuses. The extent 
of these abuses now appears so widespread that most professionals in 
development can easily list the forms of what could best be described as “shadow 
bribes” take without a moment’s hesitation. This author has personally witnessed 
them delivered, in violation of local and international laws, by almost every donor 
organization in the form of attendance fees to government officials for simply 
coming to donor workshops (listed as “per diems” or envelope money) so that 
donors can then seek and spend more money on the pretext that officials are 
eager for such training and that they have an impact, “study tours” that are 
disguised junkets, as well as hotel buffets and entertainment (usually in lavish 
Western settings) in recipient countries. Officials are also easily bought in the 
name of capacity building; with donor organizations working in fact as tour agents 
and caterers, running parties, giving away branded items with logos (including 
umbrellas, travel bags, and briefcases). Institutions like the UN appear to have 
been turned into lobbying agencies or missionaries, for hire by the larger donors 
who pay them to use government contacts to promote specific agendas of the 
international banks or of economic blocs seeking to expand their influence in trade 
agreements or “harmonization” of laws, convincing national officials to legislate and 
adopt such policies and to claim that it is their local people who have demanded 
them. 
Many other projects appear to be simply naïve, throwing money at symptoms of 
incompetence and inefficiency with no idea how organizations work, what the 
incentives are of individuals within them, or what they are even supposed to do in a 
functioning and sustainable system and this is a result both of the hiring of staff 
with few skills (other than language) and little adherence to codes of professional 
responsibility, with almost no outside direct public oversight. Project approval 
procedures have largely been corroded in order to facilitate (what can be described 
as “corrupt”) agendas for purchasing government systems that keep money 
flowing, many projects are implemented with no standard procedures to follow.  
As a more recent World Bank review of ‘capacity building’ projects admitted, most 
such projects ‘do not specify the capacity building objectives,’ lack ‘adequate 
needs assessments’ and do not even consider ‘processes of organizational and 
behavioural change’ (Ogiogio, 2005). Thus, large numbers of projects come to be 
funded where the goal of “training officials” is about as effective and well thought 
out as schemes teaching elephants to fly. Officials who lack the salary, the 
ideology, the incentives or the capacity will not produce services no matter how 
much education they have. In other cases, government systems that are riddled 
with nepotism or politics, receive capacity building funds that essentially seek to 
turn secretaries into brain surgeons without recognizing that the processes of 
recruitment that are politicized and corrupted and are the source of the problem. 
Rather than improve organizations, foreign funds allocated for “capacity building” 
are often propping up former generals and their children in regimes that are largely 
recognized as corrupt (by Transparency International and other organizations 
measuring accountability) in order to keep them employed and in power; building 
the “capacity” of dictatorships to maintain their rule. “Awareness raising” projects 
for “accountability” and “combating of corruption” often throw training at the very 
people who are the perpetrators of the crimes and as effective and well thought out 
as schemes trying to turn wolves into herbivores.  
The donor justification is that transferring funds to government officials to help 
“demonstrate” how to run fair judicial systems or equitable public services, can help 
convince them to “buy in” to the idea. Yet, without any pressures or conditions to 
pressure them to do that or convince them why it might be in their interest to do so, 
the approach is akin to believing that giving money to criminals for charity will turn 
them into humanitarians rather than simply end up in their foreign bank accounts. 
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Other projects offer remedial education to specialists or adults when the real 
failures have occurred in the basic education system, in professional schools, or in 
selection procedures. A lack of proper analysis of the sources of the problem again 
results in treating symptoms rather than the disease. 
The irony of “capacity building” is that the organizations claiming to be the experts 
are often the last to have their own internal experts who have read the basic 
textbooks in the field at the university or masters level. Few seem to follow the 
basics of development project design and “results-based management” (with 
standard practices like problem trees, root cause analysis, appropriate 
identification of inputs-outputs-outcomes, and use of baselines, and cost benefit 
analysis) or who even apply their own international treaty agreements and mission 
statements in areas of sustainable development and protection of cultural rights 
and diversity (rather than promotion of industrialization, consumption and economic 
exploitation) (Lempert, 2014). 
There is nothing here that cannot be improved simply by holding donor 
organizations to safeguards against conflicts of interest and to textbook principles. 
A list of some of the standard textbooks that apply to capacity building in this field 
would include those of overall systems and system change (Forrester, 1994), 
principles of legal drafting for democracy and efficacy (Seidman and Abeyesekere, 
2000), understanding of human cultural differentiation and sustainability (Ember, 
2006), basic business analysis and organizational strategy for effective 
management control (Garrison, Noreen and Brewer, 2005), principles of public 
finance (Musgrave, 1973), organizational behaviour (Robbins, 2002; Nelson and 
Quick, 2005), personnel management (Noe, Gerhart, Wright and Hollenback, 2007; 
Dresang, 2009), training and education theories to differentiate skills, perspectives, 
and information (Lempert et. al., 1995), and current models of promoting 
competitive business development services (World Bank, 2001). Others might be 
added in the areas of appropriate roles of NGOs (innovation and advocacy) versus 
government (services), and mechanisms for accountability and avoiding conflicts of 
interest. The point is simply that the disciplines and approaches are well 
established but many donors seem not to even know their own profession; perhaps 
deliberately.  
Vignettes: what really happens in "capacity building" projects 
Some standard project types and how they are rigged or doomed to “fail” from the 
start are described below. 
Projects to turn wolves into doves 
International projects work with all three branches of foreign governments in 
approaches that seemed designed to keep the wrongdoers in power by assuring 
that only they have the “expertise” to run government (in ways acceptable to the 
donor). While projects with Ministries seek to improve them through proselytizing 
rights treaties to the very people who are the abusers and who have no incentive to 
change, the classic examples of capacity building failures are those that work with 
the legislative and judicial branches of governments in developing countries. The 
responsibilities of these political institutions are to represent the public will in ways 
that balance interests of different cultures (to assure their sustainability) and of 
individual rights and preferences, through legislation (legislatures) and through fair 
and representative means of resolving disputes (adjudication). The “capacity” they 
need is the capacity to protect and reflect these interests in the process of 
legislation/policy and in conflict resolution among different interests. That is not 
what foreign projects seek to promote. What they do, instead, is the following in 
three basic types that this author has worked on directly. 
 UNDP Parliamentary Capacity Building Projects with donor support – 
“Parliamentary Capacity Building” projects are run almost everywhere, with 
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funding from almost every major donor. Those that the author has seen in 
several regions show no intent to address the real failings and capacity needs 
of national or local legislatures.  
If parliaments are failing, it usually means that democracy itself is missing since 
this is the real capacity underlying a legislature: the public is badly represented, 
unable to control its representatives, unable to understand what legislation is and 
how to offer it, and/or that the legislature itself is a symbolic puppet (a legacy of 
colonial rule) that has no real power to challenge military, police, or economic 
(domestic or foreign power). It may mean that the legislature is simply a ritual body 
with no real direct control of most government spending (that may come from 
overseas governments rather than from taxes or from elite control over some 
resource that generates funds). In a functioning parliament, the public sets the 
agenda for sustainable development, the courts assure that the legislature upholds 
international treaty goals for sustainable development, and competence of 
parliament is assured through the power of parliament to increase its funding 
through taxes and to hire the best people to carry out its tasks. Failed officials are 
voted out of power and their failed staffs go with them. 
What happens in these projects, however, is that the foreign donors seek to 
reinforce the idea of permanent, “efficient” and “expert” parliamentary staff 
alongside career Parliamentarians who remain no matter what election results say, 
with training in foreign languages and in passing of foreign laws favoured by the 
donors. Training includes instruction to elected deputies on how to appear 
democratic by meeting (often for the first time) with their constituents to show how 
“democratic” they are. The projects promote connections with foreign parliaments 
in donor countries as a way to create a brotherhood among these elites and in 
ways that reinforce dependency for future favours. 
 World Bank Ministry of Justice projects to promote “rule of law” – While these 
projects in “efficiency” of “administration of justice” are most often supported by 
the World Bank, they are copied by other major donors.  
As with parliaments, if judiciaries fail, the capacity problem is almost always in their 
democratic legitimacy rather than in their inability to efficiently or expertly 
administer (in)justice. Where judiciaries fail, it usually means that the public is not 
represented as jurors or in democratic oversight and balance of judges, that 
citizens lack the power to enforce norms on military, police, or domestic and 
international economic powers, and that the public and judges lack the funding to 
be educated and involved in complex decisions. Working judiciaries use the law to 
bring in the funding and expertise they need, with public support, to challenge 
abuses of power and imbalances in representation. 
What happens in these projects is that rather than focus on “justice” and equity, 
donors seek to reinforce the idea of permanent, “efficient” and “expert” elite 
selected judges who are “independent” of the public but still vulnerable to existing 
economic and military power. Support for “capacity” includes study tours, 
computers and training of judges. Projects for legal “access” mostly seek to assure 
that the legal order is efficiently enforced on individuals in minor matters and that 
edicts are known to the population rather than subject to change. 
On one Japanese funded project that the author worked on for the World Bank in a 
country described as having no rule of law and where project funding was slowed 
due to violation of Bank regulations against insider dealing of Bank funds (detailed 
in World Bank documents), a Ministry of Justice not only gave an ultimatum that 
the author steer loan funds to a committee of their friends to allocate funds for 
study tours and computers, but they also demanded a kickback from my salary to 
the Ministry. The author’s approach was to offer loans to students and to promote 
lawyers representing citizens, farmers and workers to benefit small business and 
sustainable development, rather than to just promote business law and extraction 
of that country’s resources (oil). After more than 15 years, the World Bank 
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continues to support the wrongdoing (and the same ruler and legal system remain, 
with the country increasing their oil contracts). 
 Major Donor Projects on “Human Rights” and “Anti-Corruption” with Ministry 
Officials – In many fields, capacity building has developed as part of an 
“industry” by certain donors to propagate certain treaties or moral values on the 
pretext that such proselytizing solves problems. Donors rushing to offer 
support given on the size of the perceived problem (violations of rights or 
corruption).  
In most cases, the real problem is that Ministry officials have no real power or 
incentives to confront wrongdoing and the public (and communities) are too weak 
to protect and enforce their own established rights traditions (in many cases, 
traditions that were at times more progressive than those of developed countries 
but that were and continue to be destroyed by colonialism and globalization). 
What happens on these projects is that rather than describe the power imbalances 
or the reasons why cultural systems that protected rights were destroyed, the 
projects focus on these government officials who are either powerless, indifferent, 
or the source of the problem; identifying them as “duty bearers” rather than as 
oppressors or spectators. The approach is purely symbolic and fits the definition of 
a public relations ‘whitewash’ or ‘rights wash’ (Lempert, 2011). 
Typical projects are those offering “human rights training” for police and prison 
guards who themselves may have been victims of violence or who are trained in 
violence and lack the capacity to use other approaches. Similar are courses in 
“anti-corruption” for military or officials who are simultaneously being purchased by 
foreign donors or pressured and bought by foreign governments and corporations. 
Most of what is really learned, as the author has observed by analyzing the 
curriculum and measuring the impacts, is how to mouth slogans and falsify 
international reporting on compliance. The effect is to undermine real public 
pressures for change by demonstrating the networks that the abusers have now 
established with international authorities. Meanwhile, those who attend project 
workshops not only benefit from the disguised bribes of free trips and buffets and 
per diems, but they also walk away with everything from logo blazoned umbrellas 
(a UNDP “anti-discrimination” project that the author evaluated in a formerly 
Eastern Bloc country, that actually taught officials how to destroy cultural 
differences and force everyone to the lowest common denominator as a familiar 
Stalinist example of non-discrimination) to “certificates” of course completion that 
are used as chits for study scholarships and job opportunities. 
Projects teaching elephants to fly like birds 
International projects not only work with governments but also with “civil society” 
including businesses and civil society organizations in claimed attempts to build 
capacity for “market economies” or for “democratic oversight.” A typical failure in 
both the government and public sector is that they train their “partners” with the 
very skills that the organizations lack but in areas where the specific individuals will 
never have the ability to perform those skills. In developed countries, organizations 
hire people who have the ability to work as managers or fundraisers or advertisers 
or creative product designers to expand organizations, recognizing that people 
have different and specific abilities. But in the development community, where it is 
determined that organizations cannot fire poor performers or hire competence, the 
idea is that capacity can be built by turning health Ministry secretaries into brain 
surgeons, state lumber company managers into environmentalists, state coal 
company officials into computer software entrepreneurs, and military officials at 
national and local levels into legislative drafters for democratic participatory 
oversight laws. Examples of two common types of failures are the following. 
 NGO Capacity Building to Promote Civil Society – Almost every donor now 
seeks to support “civil society” projects. What that usually means, in the 
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author’s experience evaluating projects in this sector, is throwing money at 
those organizations that have been created as dependent branches of foreign 
NGOs to oppose or perform the functions of governments in recipient 
countries, rather than to actually rise up as citizen funded representative 
organizations that act as monitors of government and business to assure their 
accountability. Since these organizations are established as administrative 
arms of foreigners that have no understanding of how to respond to citizens in 
their own country by offering them real benefits and asking for their funds, 
attempts to build their capacity and make them sustainable fall on deaf ears. 
Often what they really teach is the fundraising skills of how to keep appealing 
to foreigners for money. With little or no management ability, little or no ability 
to plan, and no understanding of the actual role of civil society, “capacity 
building” here in skills like management, strategic planning, or even higher 
skills of statistics and lobbying, is almost always the equivalent of the blind 
leading the blind. 
 European Commission Network of Schools of Political Studies to Teach 
Tolerance and Rights – A typical capacity building project supported by various 
donors is on reaching out to young elites in developing countries in a purported 
attempt to train them in new concepts such as “democracy” as those countries 
are brought into the orbit of the donor. The European Commission, for 
example, in a project evaluated by this author, spent millions of Euro identifying 
young political elites (usually ruling Party members, on career tracks of political 
patronage) in former Soviet and Eastern European countries being brought into 
Europe, on the pretext of teaching them “human rights”, “tolerance” and other 
European “democratic” values. In fact, what these projects appear to actually 
teach is how to conduct political discussions behind closed doors with political 
elites, including those of Europe, and how to maintain “networks” with each 
other through meetings in international hotels, rather than through meetings 
and accountability to their own publics. The Moscow branch of this school 
brought Henry Kissinger to Russia to explain to these identified future elites 
how he ran an unaccountable U.S. foreign policy under the Nixon 
Administration. 
Section IV: How some organizations do in "capacity building", 
scored using the proposed indicator 
Below are the results of use of the indicator offered in this article on several 
different categories of international capacity building interventions that are 
described in international development literature. Some of them are from the 
author’s first hand experiences in more than 30 years in international and 
community development work. From the categories, it is clear how the scoring 
works to separate different types of projects in terms of quality as well as to expose 
hidden agendas and failures and to note where there is a need for accountability 
and improvement. 
Note that even though not every question applies to every kind of project, the 
scoring is still designed to yield a scoring spread that leads to categorization and 
comparison and that also shows how some projects in a category can do better or 
worse depending on their attention to specific project features that are highlighted 
in the scoring system. 
Before reading these results, consider the following. Most “self-rating” systems 
using indicators grossly over-inflate results because of the natural tendency to look 
uncritically at one’s own projects (why there is a need for clear and objective 
grading standards) and because there is a tendency to avoid considering several 
organizations at once when rating those organizations one favours. Any rating 
instrument needs to be “calibrated”; i.e., tested for consistency using the same test 
question multiple times on multiple organizations in order to reveal differences. 
Each observer doing the test ultimately reaches some internal consistency after a 
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number of tests, but different observers are likely to come up with different results 
because they are “harder” or “softer.” The scores below are those consistent with 
the judgment of the author and they are an example of strict application of the 
ideas, such that weaknesses are revealed as areas where improvement is needed. 
If such a tool is ultimately adapted by professionals and subject to multiple tests, 
there would ultimately be a consensus on the scaling and the rating system. 
The scoring below is not an “absolute” and there is not enough space in this article 
to present the full detail and evidence to fully explain the scoring for every 
organization. A sample of the process with full detail for one organization is 
provided in Appendix Section V. Here, the reader should view the scores as 
coming from a larger set of data and the professional judgments of the author in 
following standard social science disciplinary protocols. 
Models of Comprehensive Capacity Building: 8-11 points. The examples that fall 
into this category are rare. 
The Marshall Plan De-Nazification of (West) Germany after World War II – Though 
it is a bit of historical guess-work, probably the Allied reconstruction of Germany 
after World War II would earn 9 to 11 points, at the top of the scale. There was little 
danger of collusion with the Nazi officials since they were sentenced for war 
crimes, and the approach was to rebuild democracy and rule of law at all levels 
from the schools to the courts to the constitutional and political system. Given the 
understanding of sustainability in 1945, the approach fulfilled it (and tried to begin 
to rebuild cultures of minorities like Jews and Roma/Gypsies). Of course there was 
self-interest on the part of the U.S. and U.S. corporate and global interests 
(possibly losing a point on Question 10), though the U.S. also understood the long 
term future interest of a sustainable Germany and built a country that competed 
with the U.S. economically. There are also questions as to whether the U.S. 
military and government that were implementing this aid were really subject to 
clear accountability to the U.S. public (though possibly more so then than today!). 
This is a model intervention, but it also occurred under rare and specific 
circumstances. For comparison, you can compare the “de-capacitization” that 
occurred in East Germany under the Soviets. 
“Street Law” Civic Education Projects, “Where There is No Doctor” Training of 
Basic Primary Health Care, Grameen Bank Community Self-Financed Lending, 
“Manage Your Own Business” Training for Family and Household Businesses 
(GTZ and other donors), and Small Scale Participatory User-Group Projects (such 
as AFAP’s Local Contributory Irrigation Projects – The common dimension of these 
projects is that they start with a basic need (legal skills, health skills, business and 
lending skills) and work directly with community groups to build those skills and to 
change cultures at grassroots levels. In doing so, they can earn about 8 points. 
These NGO projects are all examples of competence in capacity building in 
specific fields, building sector and governance skills and institutionalizing them, 
where major donors fail. The weaknesses that these organizations share is that 
they do not consider the overall sustainable development impact of their 
interventions that could be negative (Question 1) and they don’t look at the larger 
systems that have failed to seek ways to get to the real root causes of the problem 
(Question 3). However, they score well in other areas. There are no conflicts of 
interest in their work but they potentially distort existing service systems (Question 
18). 
Minimally Competent Approach to Capacity Building: 4-7 points. Examples here 
are of interventions that are technically competent but that may be largely flawed 
from a development perspective as destructive of local cultures. 
British Establishment of Public Administration Schools in Colonial Africa in 1950 as 
Part of State-Building; French Support for Public Health Systems (Hospitals, 
“Pasteur” and other Institutes) in Colonial Africa and Indochina – The “positive” 
aspects of the European colonial legacy are the institutions that have carried over 
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in those countries in the post-colonial period and both of these interventions score 
about 4-5 points. The areas in which they are deficient are clear: the goal was not 
to promote sustainable development of the natives but to “civilize” them in ways 
that destroyed their cultures and “modernized” them to follow European 
approaches. Systems were not “fixed” but destroyed. So there are no points on 
Questions 1 or 8, and colonial regimes are not models of accountability (Question 
10), but these projects score 7 of the 11 positive points. These colonial 
interventions obviously created and empowered local elites (Questions 13 and 16) 
and there were conflicts of interest on the parts of the colonial implementers 
(Question 15), for a loss of about 3 points.  
Narrow or Weak Intervention: 0 – 3 points. Projects that are technically competent 
and that offer public training through market solutions can also score points on 
competency but fail if they are promoting a particular agenda that is not sustainable 
development and that could distort overall government functions. 
Agricultural Extension projects of major donors and Small Business Promotion 
Projects (of donors like the World Bank’s International Finance 
Corporation/Mekong Project Development Facility in Southeast Asia) -- These 
projects can earn between 2 to 6 points, depending on how carefully they actually 
promote a “business development services” approach that builds private sector 
capacity, rather than seeks to replace it. Among specific skills promotion projects 
that work widely with the public on training and outreach and that offer fee based 
courses or services, these approaches are technically competent in the very basics 
of capacity building. The reason they only earn about 4 points of the first 7 is that 
they do not consider overall development (they start with an ideology of 
productivity) and do not effectively measure the overall function of learning and 
applying information (about business or agriculture). The organizations running 
these projects are not accountable and the approaches they promote are 
sometimes sustainable and long-term but sometimes only short-term inputs. They 
may lose points for subsidizing elites or for failing to promote truly comprehensive 
and market based solutions. 
Administration of Justice Projects, Judicial Training Projects, Human Rights 
Training for Police and Judges, projects of the World Bank, European Commission 
(EC), USAID, UNDP, and other donors – These projects, described in vignettes, 
sometimes show slight benefits in improving efficiency or in ameliorating 
symptoms, but they lose points by failing to focus on democracy and equity and by 
entrenching existing elites and their inequities, and at best score 3 points if they 
save public funds and address inefficiencies in spending and government action, 
though more often go slightly negative. 
Incompetent Projects with Hidden Agendas that have been corrupted Either By the 
Donor Agency, Stakeholders in a Developing Country Bureaucracy, or Both: < 0 
points. International organizations working in areas like “justice” and “anti-
discrimination” and building “parliamentary” and “government” “capacity,” claim to 
be doing much more than they really are and the test exposes them, quickly as 
promoting hidden agendas that undermine democracy rather than promote it, with 
scores of 0 to as low as minus 7 points (-7).  
United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and other “Local 
Development” Projects supported in almost the same model by a large number of 
donors (e.g., the SEILA project in Cambodia with DFID, World Bank, and UNDP 
support, local governance projects of GTZ, SNV, Lux-Dev, and Belgian 
Development Assistance in Vietnam) – All of these projects work on a common 
model of transferring funds to local government officials to promote necessary 
“decentralization,” with claims that they are simultaneously building local 
government “capacity” and supporting “participation/democracy” by asking some 
local citizens what gifts they would prefer from the foreign donors in a list of 
giveaways. A typical score for these projects is strongly negative (-4.5 points), 
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suggesting that not only do they lack competence but that they are being used to 
manipulate local governments and destroy local systems for a colonial objective of 
the donor. The detailed analysis in the Appendix (Section V) of UNCDF 
demonstrates the conflicts of interest and the lack of professionalism built into the 
design of these approaches. These projects fail to examine what systems are 
broken from the perspective of local cultures and are used to promote agendas of 
globalization/export and industrialization that are favourable to donors and in 
violation of international treaty agreements. 
School of the Americas (U.S. Military) and Other Military and Police Capacity 
Building Programs in Iraq and Elsewhere – As expected these projects to build 
“professionalism” may have good log frames and partly support the role of defence 
and security (+1.5 points) but they do not look at root causes of instability and work 
to militarize conflicts, building systems that weaken citizen control over their 
militaries and elites, militarize conflicts, and are in the interests of the U.S. more 
than local citizens (-5 points), leading to a score of minus 3.5 points (-3.5). They 
actually score slightly higher, ironically, than “local development” projects because 
they are strengthening a system, despite the negative effects of that system. 
‘Civil Society Promotion’ Projects of the European Union (EU) and USAID in the 
Balkans and Elsewhere, Ashoka Foundation Civil Society Grants – The standard 
“civil society” promotion project of major donors transfers funds and builds skills of 
a select number of Western-style NGOs (rather than already existing community 
organizations of political, tribal, or religious identity) in ways that undermine their 
sustainability and seek to transform rather than repair local cultural mechanisms; 
earning minus 5 points (-5). The roles of NGOs are defined as providing services 
that government should provide or lobbying for foreign concerns rather than 
aggregating local interests with local control and sustainable funding. The projects 
score no positive points because they do not examine local needs and do not build 
overall skills or functions, but pick organizations and partners to receive funds. 
Partners in developing countries who receive funds and counterparts who 
administer the projects introduce biases (loss of 3 points) and the projects actually 
weaken citizens relative to these foreign-funded organizations, while also distorting 
civil society and the appropriate role of government and civil society in services 
(loss of 2 points). Instead, these projects should start at the school level, teaching 
skills, and work with existing organizations that were weakened by colonial rule. 
Standard UNDP, EU, and World Bank Capacity Building at the National 
Government Level with Parliaments, Planning and Investment Ministry, and Line 
Ministries – While these expensive projects should reflect the highest competence 
and the state of the art in procedures, the reality is that they are at the bottom of 
the scale, failing in almost every way, and scoring minus 7 points (-7). The 
indicator easily exposes them as indicative of an agenda that is designed to buy off 
foreign governments and to make them unaccountable to their publics in support of 
an external agenda, rather than to promote capacity in line with international law 
and basic principles of development. They score no positive points because they 
do not seek to balance sustainable systems, address existing problems, find what 
is broken and needs to be fixed, or promote necessary functions (such as 
“legislation” or “asset protection”). Instead of defining and measuring a problem, 
projects are targeted at specific government entities and justified on the basis of 
symptoms (“weak governance,” “corruption”) and the need for “governance” 
projects to “promote development” or “promote the Millennium Development 
Goals.” There is no measure of output or outcome other than receipt of transfers of 
money and services that are then defined as “strengthened.” Almost all potential 
conflicts of interest are present (loss of 4 points) and the ability of officials to 
influence the projects also promotes weakening of citizen powers and oversight 
and subsidization of country elites (further loss of 3 points). 
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Section V: An example of applying the indicator: The United 
Nations Capital Development Fund 
Scoring of United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) on the 20 
component questions of the indicator 
Preliminary Information for Assessment 
UNCDF’s 
Organizational 
Mission (Claim) and 
Role of Capacity 
Building according to 
UNCDF website  
‘The United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) offers a unique combination of 
investment capital, capacity building and technical advisory services to promote microfinance and 
local development in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)’ 
Through its programmes, UNCDF strives to contribute to the attainment of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and to the implementation of the Brussels Programme of Action for 
LDCs in a direct, concrete and measurable way.  
There is growing consensus that democratic governance creates the conditions for sustainable 
development and poverty reduction. Similarly, it is increasingly accepted that achieving the MDGs 
and eradicating poverty needs to be done at the local level and thus requires the involvement of 
local authorities. 
UNCDF's local development programmes support national decentralization strategies in the 
LDCs and seek to improve social services, governance and pro-poor economic infrastructure at 
the local level by providing technical assistance and investment capital directly to local 
authorities. UNCDF's investment capital is flexible, high-risk and innovative. It is channeled 
primarily to poor rural areas in the LDCs where poverty reduction, capacity and governance 
challenges are typically the greatest.  
UNCDF’s “Capacity 
Building” Activities in 
practice, according to 
UNCDF website  
 
Overview of Claimed Activities: UNCDF's Local Development Programmes (LDPs) introduce 
participatory planning and budgeting systems at the local level. These programmes seek to 
ensure a voice for women and other disadvantaged groups in local public decision-making. The 
programmes also work within, and support, the national system of central-local government 
institutional and fiscal relations.  
Description of Actual Interventions: 
- Emphasis on Local Level Institutional Development: Improving procedures and practices for 
local level resource mobilization and public expenditure management (including development 
planning, investment programming, performance budgeting, procurement, implementation, asset 
management and internal controls) to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of 
local authorities in poverty reduction activities.  
- Performance-linked block-grant funding facility: Providing local authorities with general purpose 
development budget support for sustainable, small-scale, local investments in social and 
economic infrastructure, such as schools, health clinics, rural roads, water and sanitation and 
natural resources management. This support is linked to agreed measures of local performance 
and serves as an incentive for local capacity building. 
- Local Economic Development: This approach emphasizes the importance and leadership of 
local authorities in encouraging and supporting local entrepreneurship and local enterprise 
creation.  
Overall analysis of 
UNCDF in using the 
tool of “capacity 
building”  
UNCDF has no clear mission statement and starts off its mission by defining its tools rather than 
its ends. It confuses several potential end goals that it offers as political slogans without 
definitions – sustainable development, the MDGs (that do not promote sustainable development if 
improperly applied), eradicating poverty, and local development – with means to those ends such 
as microfinance, governance, and decentralization. Rather than offer measurements of results, it 
justifies actions on the basis of politics and slogan of a “growing consensus” that has no clear link 
to beneficiaries or the public that funds the organization. The role of “capacity building” along with 
other tools like investment capital is equally confused, with the role of these tools in helping to 
achieve the means to an ends or the ends unclear. There seems to be a formulaic approach to 
building local government infrastructure for delivering grants to increase productivity, rather than 
supporting democratic accountability or sustainable development, or protecting communities or 
cultural groups.  It looks like the organization is opportunistic rather than goal driven and this 
waves red flags for the use of “capacity building” as an appropriate development tool. UNCDF 
offers several slogans about how it is “participatory,” builds local tax systems and other forms of 
“accountability” but none of this is demonstrated in operating procedures or design given that it 
simply funnels money and training to local officials without assessing the problems or building 
citizen skills. An organization that defines itself by shifting of money and resources (here simply 
“investment capital”) and promoting “growth” without clear development ends is almost certain to 
score miserably on a development index that tests how it seeks to use a tool properly and 
professionally for development objectives. 
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Analysis 
Question Indicator Scoring 
I.  
Proper Application of the 
Basic Principles and 
Standards of Capacity 
Building and Donor 
Interventions  
Scoring in the first category demonstrates that UNCDF’s approach to capacity 
building is an afterthought or opportunistic slogan at best, to promote an 
agenda that is not one of sustainable development and that does not follow the 
basic competence and requirements of sustainable development. 
1.5 points 
I. a.)  
Project Meets 4 of 5 
Recognized Principles 
of Capacity Building and 
of Basic Professionalism 
In the initial review of competence, with a checklist of 7 basic attributes of 
capacity building, UNCDF does not achieve more than 1. This is a “capacity 
building” organization that lacks the basic competence in its own field. This 
initial scoring raising red flags that UNCDF is either opportunistic, completely 
mismanaged, or hiding another agenda. 
1 point. 
1.  
 
Intervention is Fit to 
Country and Cultural 
Needs for Sustainable 
Development  
UNCDF does no independent analysis of minority cultural sustainability even 
though it purports to work on “decentralization” as a goal, and it does not 
conduct overall analysis of sustainability. Its focus is only on economic 
production not on achieving the development balance to protect resources or to 
balance consumption with production. This is business investment, not 
development that meets international treaty standards. 
0 points. 
2.  
 
Governance or Civil 
Society Functions are 
Appropriate and Key 
and there is Direct 
Public Accountability 
Several of the functions that UNCDF promotes are relevant government 
functions: capital budgeting and investment policy to protect and promote 
assets. It is debatable whether it is really doing so in ways that really protect 
funds and capital investments in communities or not. It is also debatable 
whether it is promoting these assets on a per capita or community basis. They 
appear to be promoting the private sector though it is not clear whether they are 
protecting the public against its power. 
Assume they know their business and award 1 point, though a more stringent 
scoring would award 0.5 points.  
3.  
 
Diagnosis Includes Full 
Framework Analysis of 
all Levels Affecting 
Capacity 
There is no evidence that UNCDF analyzes the problems in each country or 
locality before moving to apply a formulaic tool and approach. They are starting 
with the tools before analyzing all of the dimensions of the problem. 
0 points. 
4.  
 
Intervention Targets 
Root Causes and 
Problems, Not 
Symptoms, are Defined 
and Mapped 
The country analyses that they have done to date show no evidence of problem 
trees or root cause analysis and simply list symptoms of weak government 
management of various sectors. 
0 points. 
5.  
 
Logframe Targets Root 
causes with 
Benchmarks and Cost 
Effectiveness Measures 
UNCDF’s logframes bear the hallmark of lack of competence of most projects 
in the U.N. system in that the “outputs” are simply restatements of the inputs 
with no benchmarks or cost-benefits and no true measurable outputs in terms 
of service performance and capacity. 
0 points. 
6.  
 
Public Accountability 
Mechanisms are Part of 
the Assessment and a 
First Priority 
UNCDF claims that it builds democracy and accountability but the reality is that 
its activities are with government officials. There is no attempt to start teaching 
basic concepts of finance, investment, and government oversight to citizens as 
part of basic civic skills, which would truly meet the goals of improving local 
government performance and accountability. 
0 points. 
7.  
 
The Project Agreement 
is Transparent and 
Accountable to Citizens 
UNCDF actually worsens the problem it claims to be solving with regard to 
democratization and accountability to citizens. If the goal is accountability, the 
project agreements need to start with the public and model public oversight, 
rather than start with government officials who are the symptoms of the 
problem (unrepresentative, non-transparent, possibly corrupt). 
0 points.  
I. b.)  
Sustainability of Impact 
(5th Principle of 
Capacity Building) 
0 points are to be awarded here because UNCDF does not meet the threshold 
of at least 4 points in the first seven questions. However, even if it did, it still 
would not receive points for these two questions. 
8.  
 
Intervention Fixes a 
Broken System at the 
Heart of the Problem 
UNCDF never identifies the system that is broken and the root causes to be 
fixed, nor does it institutionalize a new kind of system. It simply trains existing 
officials who may or may not be in place in the future rather than creating 
institutions to add needed skills into the society. 
0 points. 
9.  
Intervention 
Institutionalizes a 
Flexible, Funded, 
Sustainable System 
UNCDF’s small credit projects may be sustainable if they are properly managed 
and safeguarded but there is no evidence to suggest that local government 
financial systems will maintain themselves after the intervention or that the 
categories of block grants will be maintained after the intervention ends. 
0 points. 
I. c.)  
Internal Project 
Procedures Model Good 
Governance and 
Capacity 
The organization itself is not open and accountable but it does have at least a 
partial commitment to the idea of conditionality. 
0.5 points. 
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10. 
Donor Agency is Itself a 
Model of Accountability 
and Capacity 
UNCDF is not directly accountable to the public that funds it or the beneficiary 
public where it works and its procedures bear the hallmark of an unaccountable 
bureaucracy largely shrouded in secrecy, typical of the UN system and large 
donors. 
0 points. 
11.  
 
Project Conditions Aid 
on Clear Capacity 
Improvements with 
Measurable Beneficiary 
Results 
UNCDF claims that it sets performance conditions though performance seems 
to be based not on capacity and services but rather on economic productivity 
gains or transfers that occur as a result of assistance. 
0.5 points given that the kind of conditionality UNCDF offers has debatable 
impact. 
II.  
Professional Safeguards 
in Place Against 
Conflicts of Interest and 
Unintended 
Consequences 
Though claiming to promote both government and the private sector, UNCDF 
seems to promote the worst features of both with no safeguards. 
-6 points 
II. a.)  No Conflicts of Interest 
UNCDF is highly vulnerable to conflicts of interest given the way that it operates 
to toss funds into localities and to promote business. 
-2.5 points 
12.  
 
Needs Assessment 
Protects Against Biases 
of Stakeholder 
Recipients 
It seems that UNCDF already has a formulaic approach and is not much 
influenced by local priorities. However, its commitment to “participation” and to 
offering funds along with capacity building is a sign that it is vulnerable to using 
funds to pander to local interests for political reasons. 
-0.5 points. 
13.  
Inputs Do Not 
Personally Benefit 
Stakeholder/Partners 
There is no indication from project documents that UNCDF is offering salary 
supplements to local officials or that recipients of training are going on to better 
paying jobs. However, there are no clear policies to screen against it. 
-0.5 points. 
14.  
 
Grant Funds are Directly 
Linked to Capacity 
Improvements and Not 
Budget Subsidies 
UNCDF offers grant funds in order to fund economic growth and certain 
policies, even while claiming that it is part of capacity building. This is an 
example of failure. 
-1 point 
15. 
 
Donor Implementing 
Agents are Screened for 
Conflicts of Interest 
There is no direct evidence that UNCDF partners or consultants are profiting 
directly from export businesses and deals with localities where they are sent, 
but there is an inference within the organization that the goal is to hire business 
experts to promote business and trade rather than to assure sustainable local 
business development, and there are no ethics codes or other forms of 
screening in this area. 
-0.5 points 
II. b.)  
No Negative or Adverse 
Impacts on Public or 
Private Systems 
UNCDF’s projects appear to exist to promote UNCDF’s glory in promoting 
business and productivity rather than in protecting communities or local 
systems. UNCDF lacks the discipline either of a bank or a government agency 
and seems to introduce the worst characteristics of both. 
-3.5 points 
16. 
 
Citizen Powers are 
Strengthened Relative 
to Officials 
UNCDF’s modality of working directly with government officials suggests that it 
is rooting authority and connections in particular individuals and at particular 
places rather than in the society in ways that will disempower citizens. 
-1 point 
17. 
 
Focus is on Equity, 
Participation, 
Accountability and Not 
Efficiency 
The focus of UNCDF’s interventions seems to be on governmental efficiency 
rather than on equity or participation, though the small credit and community 
approach partly counters this. 
-0.5 points 
18. 
 
Aid Does not Distort 
Financial Systems or 
Subsidize Elites 
UNCDF’s choice to award grants rather than to work as a bank and award 
loans, and its lack of assessment of community savings and tax policies as a 
prelude to grants suggests that it is subsidizing elites and distorting the very 
fiscal policies it claims to be building. 
-1 point 
19. 
 
Public and Private 
Functions are Kept in an 
Appropriate Balance 
with Proper Roles 
It is questionable whether UNCDF’s intervention in small credit is interfering 
with the private sector. There are also questions as to whether UNCDF’s pro-
business ideology includes any protections for consumers or communities 
through regulation. 
-0.5 points 
20. 
 
Market Systems are 
Promoted where 
Possible 
UNCDF’s capacity building through local governments is done through outside 
consultants even though building financial expertise is best left to business 
schools and government training centers. This suggests a potential distortion of 
these private and public services. 
-0.5 points 
Total:  
  
UNCDF’s score in capacity building is strongly negative, suggesting that it is 
using “capacity building” simply as a slogan to promote a corporatist and 
business agenda that is in fact undermining development and governance 
objectives rather than promoting them. 
-4.5 points 
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Analysis of UNCDF is based not only on its own statements on its website but also 
from review of some 8 project documents in as many countries (a 20 percent 
sample of 40 project countries in 2009) including its logframes, problem 
statements, results measures, inputs and overall goals and project logic at the 
request of one of UNCDF’s regional offices. A copy of this review of tensions in 
UNCDF’s overall mission and overall deficiencies in standards, is on file with the 
author. Neither this review nor any similar critique has been posted on UNCDF’s 
website and provides evidence of the organization’s inability to follow such claimed 
procedures of transparency and stakeholder participation in its own activities. 
